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BILL

T.

ARNOLD

Biblical Perspectives on Torture: War Crime~ the
Lzmzts of RetaliatIOn, and the Roman Cross
Our concept of "torture" has a narrow and generally accepted definition as
the "infliction of severe bodily pain, as punishment or a means of
persuasion."1 The Bible has no exact equivalent, and if we limit our discussion
to this definition, we might too quickly conclude the Bible has little if anything
to say directly about torture. This is so because the Bible's lexical specifics have
broader connotations. Words translated "oppress" or "torment" have
semantic domains close to our meaning of "torture," but not precisely
equivalent. 2 Thus the standard Bible dictionaries and encyclopedias are more
likely to have entries on "crime and punishment" than "torture," and these
have quite different themes to cover. On the other hand, if we define "torture"
as the use of excessive physical or mental pain against one's enemy combatant
or against innocent victims of armed conflict - what we might today call "war
crimes" - then the Bible has plenty to say about this topic. Although the Old
Testament does not contain large numbers of texts for us to consider, it has
important passages in Deuteronomy and Amos pertinent to this theme, as
well as scattered texts in the legal corpora. The New Testament, of course,
presents the most vivid symbol of torture in human history in the form of
the Roman crosS.
The Old Testament contains passages that reflect the horrors of wartime
torture, especially by prohibiting Israel from engaging in such inhumane acts
or in condemning such actions in Israel's neighbors. 3 The most important of
these texts comes from the book of Deuteronomy, which establishes (1)
rules for conducting the war of conquest, when Israel entered the Promised
Land and defeated the seven nations (sometimes six are listed) inhabiting the
land (Deut 7: 1-26), as well as (2) rules for ordinary warfare conducted after the
settlement against enemies outside the Promised Land (Deut 20: 1-20; 21: 1014, and cf. also 23:9-14; 24:5). With regard to the war of conquest, the famously
difficult concept of "devotion to destruction" (/:lerem) seems impossible to
interpret for today's readers. Such a ban prohibiting personal consumption
4
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or the taking ofplunder is attested elsewhere in the ancient Near East, but in
Israel it applies only to the war of conquest! \X/hen the Promised Land
becomes Israel's, its inhabitants are devoted to Yahweh as a sacrifice in order
to make the land itself holy and suitable for Yahweh's presence. \XJe cannot
address the admittedly perplexing questions raised by this feature of the Old
Testament in this brief paper. s It is enough to observe that the command
and practice of exercising such a ban of destruction is limited to Israel's wars
of conquest. It is the rules for ordinary warfare that hold promise for insight
into our topic, to which we now turn.
The paradigmatic passages prescribing how Israel is to view warfare
generally, Deut 20:1-20 and 21:10-14, occur in a series of legal texts (Deut 1226).' Their placement here aligns them with the Sixth Commandment, the
prohibition of murder,? and thus they generally take up the topic of limitations
on the taking of human life and shedding of innocent blood. The debate
between pacifism or "non-violence" versus just war or "justifiable warfare"
theory is another topic beyond the scope of this paper, so it is enough at this
juncture to observe that Deuteronomy makes the assumption that Israel,
once settled in the Promised Land, will live in a world in which war against
external enemies is inevitable. s And so Deut20:1-20 and 21:1O-14Iay down
strict guidelines for the conduct of warfare.
Deuteronomy is first aware that wartime becomes an occasion for events
or experiences that simply ought not to be so. Terror or panic should not
become the prevailing principle for Israelite warriors, even before a superior
military force, because Yahweh himself does battle for them (20:3-4). More
specifically, the builder of a new house should not fail to dedicate it himself
because he has been killed in battle (20:5), nor should the planter of a vineyard
fail to enjoy its fruit because he has become a casualty of war (20:6). E,-\ually
tragic is the young man who fails to marry his fiancee because he has fallen in
battle (20:7). We see from these guidelines that Israel's principles for engaging
the enemy in warfare are efforts to avoid whatever seems inhumane or unfair,
in these cases, for Israelite warriors. Similarly, the next paragraph lays down
rules for besieging cities that are not numbered among the inhabitants of
Canaan (20:10-15). While enemy peoples within the boundaries of the
Promised Land are to be annihilated during the war of conquest, any city
outside the boundaries are to be offered terms of peace prior to the conflict
(20:10). If they accept the terms, they are spared although reduced to forced
labor. Othelwise, all males are to be exterminated, while the women, children,
livestock, and other possessions may be taken as booty. The law thus
establishes a means for waging peace instead of war wherever possible, and
then restricts the extent to which Israel can plunder its enemies.
The last paragraph of Deuteronomy 20 censures gratuitous destruction
of trees, and especially protects the fruit trees of Israel's enemies (20:19-20).9
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Fruit trees served a central feature in ancient life-support systems, taking
many years to mature and requiring long-term care and cultivationY' The
rhetorical question - "Are trees in the field human beings cilat they should
come under siege from you?" - draws focus to ilie human tragedy when the
area's ecosystem is ruined, and therefore condemns the "scorched-eardl policy"
so frequent in warfare of all periods, Israel is not permitted to employ a
military tactic that leaves behind a mined ecosystem and deprives future
inhabitants of the area of a viable life-support system.
A tlnal concern of Deuteronomy's laws of warfare is the humane
treatment of captives (21:10-14). The passage assumes a scenario in which
Yahweh has granted victory to Israel against an outside enemy. If an Israelite
soldier is attracted to a woman captured from the vanquished enemy, he is
not only prohibited from raping her, as so often happens in warfare, but he
must accord her proper rites of mourning for her losses, provide time for her
to become fully integrated into Israelite society and culture, and make her a
full wife, equal in status to any ociler wives. Furthermore, she will be protected
under ilie same rules of divorce that pertain to Israelite wives. The central
concern here is for ilie dignity of prisoners of war, and especially captured
women.
Tn sum, the laws of warfare in Deuteronomy do not address criteria for
going to war (ius ad bellum) but are exclusively devoted to proper conduct
of the war (ius in bello). This does not mean Deuteronomy provides a
precise manual of military rules, for we tlnd nothing here of weaponry, tleld
tactics, or overall stratagems. Instead, Deuteronomy's military laws provide
limitations on inhumanity in times of warfare. The book of Deuteronomy
urges its readers to tlnd "avenues of compassion, human concern, and care
of ilie natural order in the midst of the death and destruction" endemic to
warY As this may relate to ilie question of torture in our contemporary
context, it may be said that Deuteronomy establishes a principle of restrain!,
including fairness and concern for the well-being of those who must conduct
the war, protection of the environment, and civility for noncombatant
captives. Taken together these laws "bespoke a humanitarian idealism that
sought to hold in check military abandon," including wanton destructiveness
and cruelty.12
Beyond cile specific laws of war fowld in Deuteronomy, ilie Old Testament
has other passages here and there that reveal a concern for compassion and
humaneness in ilie conduct of war. Perhaps most striking in this regard is the
list of war-crimes detailed in the condemnation of Israel's neighbors in
Amos 1-2. Other prophetic books contain oracles against the nations (d. Isa
13-23; Jer 46-51; and Ezek 25-32), but Amos's are unique in several ways.
Nowhere else does a prophetic book b(I!,in wiili the oracles against the nations,
nor organize them around a recurring rhetorical formula so systematically as
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Amos, nor use that formula to compare and contrast the sins of Judah and
Israel with the other nations. It is doubtful whether these oracles were ever
actually intended to be addressed to the nations in view, but instead their sins
and punishments are intended to be lessons for the Israelite audience.
The crimes of the nations are war crimes and general atrocities against
humanity. There was nothing so elaborate as the Geneva Convention in
antiquity, nor even anything like the rules of chivalry of medieval warfare. Yet
Amos assumes the right to appeal to principles of conduct that he believes all
nations oughtto accept. 13 Where they fail to live up to the international common
ethos, they become responsible for their own "transgressions" (pesa" a
particularly strong word for "sins"), we might say based on natural or general
revelation. Thus, the Phoenicians, Philistines, Moabites, etc., are responsible
for their war crimes, just as Israel and Judah are for their failure to maintain a
just society, although the responsibility of other nations is more generally
assumed rather than specifically related to the Torah of Yahweh. These crimes
against humanity are not mentioned in regard to Judah and Israel, not because
they were never guilty of them, but because they were held to a higher standard,
a standard of law and revelation.!4 The nations must answer for their sins,
but Yahweh uses a different standard than that for Israel and Judah, who are
responsible for Torah observance and the social welfare of all in their
kingdoms. Thus, Amos 1-2 uses the rhetorical formula to compare and
contrast the sins of the nations with those of Judah and Israel.
For our purposes in this brief survey, we limit our discussion to the
crimes of Damascus, Gaza, Tyre, Edom, Ammon, and Moab. These are
condemned because they are guilty of crimes that may in general be described
as unchecked militarism. In the specific crimes of Israel's and Judah's neighbors
in Amos 1:3 - 2:3, this includes inhuman treatment of captives, exiling
defeated populations, cruel treatment of innocent noncombatants, and
unrestrained violence against one's enemies.
1:3, Damascus "threshed Gilead with threshing sledges of iron"
1:6, Gaza "carried into exile entire communities, to hand them over
to Edom"
1:9, Tyre "delivered entire communities over to Edom"
1:11, Edom "pursued his brother with the sword and cast off all
pity; he maintained his anger perpetually, and kept his
wrath forever"
I :13, Ammon "ripped open pregnant women in Gilead in order to
enlarge d,eir t<:rritory"
2: 1, Moab "burned to lime the bones of the king of Edom"
The precise erime of the Arameans of Damascus against Israel's holdings in
Gilead is not entirely clear. Such sledges may have been low-hanging wagons
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with teeth or spikes of flint or iron underneath for dragging across ears of
harvested grain on a threshing floor, and some have assumed they were used
in antiquity as a torturous method of executing POWs. However, there is no
evidence from the ancient Near East of such use and it appears more likely
that we have here a "metaphor for the savage conquest of a territory."15 Both
Gaza and Tyre were guilty of exiling "entire communities," most likely
denoting the capmring and selling into captivity the populations of conquered
towns or villages. Neo-Assyrian rulers, followed to a lesser extent by their
Neo-Babylonian successors, routinely used the exile of populations, which
were resettled and often pressed into slavery. Edom's crime was a failure to
restrain anger during wartime, yielding instead to wanton and merciless killing.
Ammon's atrocity is perhaps most frightening of all, in an atrempt to wipe
out the enemy's future by killing pregnant women. Moab's crime, that of
desecrating a royal tomb, although sounding less severe, is perhaps more
telling because it illustrates the point that these are general crimes against
humanity, involving common decency that it was assumed all peoples should
knOw. The violation of tombs was a dreaded sacrilege in antiquity, and graves
were routinely protected by curses. 16 The act of removing and burning bones
would reflect a belief that doing so inflicted more harm on the dead than
could be done to the perpetrator by the protective curse. "Such a risky act
must have been motivated by intense vindictiveness."17 This table of war
crimes reflects what we may assume were widely accepted forms of warfare,
which the prophet could assume all would know - a sort of "international
customary law" or "common ethos" of agreed upon conventions and accepted
norms of conduct. 18
Beyond these proscriptions against inhumane acts of violence during
wartime, Old Testament legal texts famously establish talionic punishments,
including "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth," and so on, continuing
with hand, foot, burn, wound, and stripe (Exod21:23-25; cf. also Lev 24:1920, Deut 19:21). The practice was also an innovation in Old Babylonian law
of the early second millennium Be, which almost certainly illustrates its
origins in early semi-nomadic Amorite practices and suggests an historical
link between Babylonian and Israelite law. 19 Although the idea seems barbaric
to readers today, the purpose of the lex talionis ("the law of retaliation'') was
to establish limitations on vengeance and vindictive punishment. The idea
was to match the punishment to the crime precisely, limiting vindictiveness
and preventing unjust and cruel punishment. Jesus, of course, acknowledges
and transcends the talionic principle in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5:3839; and cf. 7:12 and Luke 6:31) but in general, the Greco-Roman world of the
fIrst century was no improvement on it. This leads us to turn briefly to the
New Testament for insight on this topic, in which we fInd few passages
specilically devoted to "torture." Instead we fInd at its theological core perhaps
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the most famous symbol of cruel and tortuous punishment - the Roman
cross, which transgresses well beyond the preventive protections of the Old
Testament's lex talionis. Death by crucifixion for a Rabbi guilty of teaching
submission to the Roman Emperor but accused of insurrection is certainly
an example of disproportionate punishment and demonstrates that the
Israelite ideal of limited retaliation institutionalized in the talionic principle
would have been an improvement over Roman practices.
The Roman cross is itself perhaps the ultimate symbol of the inhumanity
of humans or the extent to which one human being can torture and maim
another beyond all reasonable limits. We have archaeological evidence for
crucifixion in the first century AD, which provides illuminating details of its
procedures and excruciating results.20 We know that the practice has origins in
the ancient Near East prior to the Romans, most crediting the Persians with
inventing it as a mode of execution. 2! If the Roman practice of cross-beam
crucifixion is to be found in Persian execution by impalement, we even have
reference to this practice in late biblical times (Ezra 6: 11).22 Simple impalement
on stakes was also a favored form of public execution used by the Assyrians,
most famously illustrated by the Neo-Assyrian siege of Lachish in 701 BC,
for which we have a graphic series of reliefs from the palace of Sennacherib
showing POWs impaled on stakes near the city walls to demoralize the
conquered foe, while other POWs were stripped and flayed (for the biblical
account, see 2 Kgs 18:13-17; 2 Chr 32:9;Jer 34:7).23 Sowe conclude that while
the practice has its origins in the early first millennium BC, the Roman
innovators were dissatisfied with how quickly the victims died and presumably
wanted a way to prolong the suffering and the effect of the public spectacle.
Thus they devised the now familiar method of affixing the victim on the
stake, supported by the cross-beam, and prolonging the agony with as much
pain and ignominy as possible, as an example of what happens to those who
oppose Roman might. The Roman cross has become the ultimate symbol of
the world's ability to torture, and serves as a reminder of Assyrian, Babylonian,
Persian, Greek, and Roman institutional torture. But signiflcandy, the New
Testament's portrait of that same cross has transformed this cruelest form of
torture, by the grace of God, into a symbol of love and grace for millions of
believers around the globe and through the ages. So we close these brief
reflections on torture in the Bible by celebrating a theology that moves from
one of the vilest forms of inhumane torture - the Roman cross - to the
sublimest of all expressions of forgiveness - the cross of Christ.

Bill Arnold is professor of Old Testament and semitic languages at Asbury
Theological Seminary in Wilmore, Kentucky.
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Heard Atry Good Sermons on Torture LatelY?
\YJhen I set out to write this essay I thought it might be interesting to
survey and compare sermons that have recently been preached on the subject
of torture. While some preachers have addressed tills moral issue as a matter
of serious concern for Christians, I think it is safe to say that the vast majority
of pastors in America have chosen to remain silcnt. Perhaps a more appropriate
title for this essay might be, "Why have we not heard any good sermons on
torture lately?"
Fleming Rutledge, an evangelical Episcopalian who spends the majority
of her time in a ministry of itinerant preaching and evangelism, speaks from
the perspective provided by the Gospel in addressing the moral issue of
torture.
it is time to make the transition from American values to
the universal Christian gospel. From the standpoint of Christ
Jesus, any talk of 'deserving' [the grace of God] is treacherous
territory. Everybody seems to love tlle hymn ~\rnazing Grace,'
but not everybody understands what it means .. Amazing
grace can be understood fully only from the standpoint of the
Christian gospel. The teaclllng of] esus about love for enemes
makes no sense if it is detached from his death and resurrection.
If it were not for Good Friday and Easter, we would be justitled
in putting his teachings in a nice gilded box that we could bring
out for admiration on ceremonial occasions and kept respectfully
on a shelf the rest of the time.!
Rutledge rightly states that, because of the Gospel, we cannot make] esus
into a nice religious teacher, of either conservative or liberal leanings, as many
have done in our time. Wben the cross is detached from his life and ministry
we are unable to take his teaching seriously as a way of being and living given
form by God. This is because the Christian faith rests on a unique, unrepeatable
event that has fundamentally altered the way we understand reality. "The
cross shows us that in Christ Jesus we see God exchanging his divine life for
the life of his enemies."2
12
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The questions raised by Rutledge challenge us to begin thinking about
torture within the vision of reality given by the Gospel ofJ esus Christ who
calls, transforms, and empowers us to live truthfully; that is, according to the
truth of God made known in the incarnate, crucified, and risen Son of God.
Rather than addressing the issue of tortue directly, I want to begin with the
Gospel, considering how its message might enable us to speak and live more
truthfully in light of the message of the cross. In other words, it may be that
we will not hear sermons on moral issues such as torture until the church
becomes more attentive to the Gospel as mediated by the Apostolic faith
through the canonical witness to the person ofJesus Christ who takes visible
form in the church.
To demonstrate what this might mean, I will look to the example of
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was a leader of the confessing church in Germany
from the early 1930's until execution in 1945. As a theologian turned pastor,
Bonhoeffer's ministry was devoted to calling the church to ground its being
and life on God's Word, ccntering itself on Jesus Christ in order to stand
against the idolatrous claims made by the Thitd Reich of Adolph Hitler. Por
Bonhoeffer, a confessing church was very different from what has become
popular in America; that which might be described as either an
accomodationalist or activist church. An accommodationalist church pursues
"relevance" as it's primary aim, devising strategies for translating Christianity
to be more contemporary, or "with the times," thereby making sense of life
by fitting the Gospel into the familiar assumptions, understandings and
experiences of "reasonable" people. On the other hand, the activist church
aims to show or prove that Christianity can still be made useful to the modern
world as a good resource, tool, or program for either personal improvement
or social change. Both forms of church are very popular in our time, and may
be seen practiced in both evangelical and mainline congregations. 3
Bonhoeffer and those joined with him in the confessing church began
elsewhere. They did not start by focusing on the possible effects or results
that are produced by the Gospel according the the terms and values dictated
bv the world. They began and ended with the source, substance, and goal of
the Gospe1,Jesus Christ himself, since they were convinced that the church's
political outlook and moral vision ought to be determined by its primary
loyalty to Jesus Christ instead of its commitments to the self, nation, or
culture. In 1934, Bonhoeffer worked with theologian Karl Barth to draft the
Barmen Declaration as an act of Christian confession to this end. It begins
with these words,
'I am the way, the truth, and the life; no one comes to the
Father, but by me Oohn 14:6). It continues, "Truly, truly, I say
to you, anyone who does not enter the sheep fold by the door
but climbs in by another way, that person is a thief and a
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robber. I am the door, if anyone enters by me, the will be
saved" Oohn 10:19).
Then follows this confession,
Jesus Chris t, as he is attes ted for us in Holy Scripture, is the one
\vord of God which we have to hear and which we have to
trust and obey in life and death. We reject the false doctrine, as
though the Church could and would have to acknowledge as a
source of its proclamation, apart from and besides the one
\vord of God, still other events and powers, figures and truths,
as God's revelation. 4
In stark contrast to much of the preaching and practice of the church in
our time, the Barmen Declaration articulates a profoundly nonutilitarian (i.e.,
scriptural and theological) vision of the Gospel. This difference helps to
illumine the theological and moral crisis which prevents us from seeing that
addressing a practice such as torture is exceedingly "relevant" for the church's
witness to the Lord who was "crucified under Pontus Pilate, crucifed, died,
and was buried." In other words, a confessing church - rather than an
accomodationist or activist church - will seek the truth of revelation as an end
in itself, rather d1an as a pragmatic device for accomplishing goals and producing
results independendy of faid.; that is, in a way which departs from Jesus
Christ, as he is attested for us in Holy Scripture. The way of confession will
see Christ as an object oflove, awe, and obedience - rather d1an an object of
use, control, and manipulation, even if done for d.e sake of "reaching people"
or "changing the world" - as is claimed today.
Bonhoeffer's life and witness helps us to see that a confessing church will
seek faithfulness without equating it with effectiveness. A church which
confesses Jesus Christ wilino longer see itself - as Christ's visible body in the
world - as instrumental to ends such as a changed society or improved
individuals, but will instead see itself as a people whose being and existence
is the work of God, those whose faith and mission consist of witnessing to
the truth and reality of the Gospel through dle grace of the Holy Spirit who
judges, forms, and transforms the church into the image of Christ. In other
words, preaching which acknowledges dlat practices such as torture are
fundamentally at odds with the reality of Jesus Christ will be grounded in,
and expressive of, an ethos formed by fidelity and witness to the reality of the
Gospel - rather than those forms of religious speech that, in our time, are
described as "effective communication."
In his incomplete book, Ethics, Bonhoeffer makes clear that it is God who
speaks the final or ultimate word on our life, and that those things that are
"penultimate" must be seen and measured in light of God's word of grace.
For when God's final Word is disposed with in favor of the "penultimate" the things before that which is final - it is reduced to the quality of what is
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calculable, as a merchandise, robbed of its divine power and is thereby no
longer a gift. Bonhoeffer then describes two false ways of seeing the
penultimate and ultimate. s
One way is what he calls "the radical." This is to see only the ultimate, so
that the penultimate, the things of this life and world, are lost to our view. In
this way, God's final word of mercy becomes the "very harndness of the law,
so that everything in our human life is sin and denial." The alternative view is
that of compromise in which the ultimate - God's final word - is separated
from the penultimate things of this life. In other words, God's word of
grace simply justifies or underwrites things as they are. By way of contrast,
Bonhoeffer points to the Incarnation in which the reality of God and the
reality of humanity, the ultimate and penultimate, are reconciled inJesus Chtist.
\X1hat is earnest and serious is not some kind of Christianity, hut it is
Jesus Christ Himself. And in Jesus Christ there is neither radicalism nor
compromise, but there is the reality of God and humanity. There is no
Christianity in itself, for this would destroy the world; there is no man in
himself; for he would exclude God. Both of these are merely ideas; only the
God - Man Jesus Christ is real, and only through Him will the world be
preserved until it is ripe for its end. 6
Bonhoeffer insists we must learn by God's grace to see and speak of the
world and our life as human creatures in light of the Incarnation, since we are
neither purely spiritual beings nor autonomous human creatures capable of
living without God in the world.
Significantly, this must also include our bodily life, which is a gift to us
from God and therefore deserves its own preservation. "Since it is God's will
that there should be human life on earth in the form of bodily life, it follows
that it is for the sake of the whole man that the body possess the right to be
preserved .. The life of the body, like life in general, is both a means to an
end and an end in itself." This is an important point. The body is not only
the "penultimate," something which can be discarded at the time of death,
since Christians believe in the resurrection of the body. The body is also an
end in itself. And while subordinated to a higher purpose, it is nonetheless
true that, "If the body were only a means to an end man would have no right
to bodily joys
This would have far reaching consequences for the Christian
appraised of all the problems that have to do with the life of the body;
housing, food, clothing, recreation, play, and sex."!
This leads Bonhoeffer to the freedom of bodily life, "which includes
protections against arbitrary infringement of the liberty of the body." He
discusses slavery and rape before taking up torture. Ilis definition is worth
quoting in full.
Torture of the body is to be distinguished from that of
corporeal chastisement of which the purpose is to educate the
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mentally immature to a state of independence. It is also to be
distinguished from that of retributive punishment through
which one who is f,ruilty of a base crime against the body of
another has his dishonor brought home to him by the injury
done to his own body. By torture of the body we mean in
general the arbitrary and brutal affliction of physical pain while
taking advantage of a relative superiority of strength, and in
particular the extortion by this means of some desired
admission or statement. In such cases, the body is misused,
and therefore dishonored, exclusively as a means to the
acheivment of another man's purpose, whether it be for the
satisfaction of his lust for power or for the sake of acquiring
some particular information .. Torture is, in any case, generally
an ineffectual means of discovering the truth; though, of
course, this argument can have force only in cases where it is
really the truth that is sought for. 8
Bonhoefferwas concerned with the way torture inflicts the most extreme
dishonor on a human being and has the effect of creating intense hatred and
a desire to restore such wounded honor by the application of bodily force. In
other words, bodily dishonor will seek to avenge itself on the body of its
tormentor. For this reason, the violation of one's bodily freedom contributes
to the destruction of a creation's moral foundation and order.
Writing from prison in 1943, Bonhoeffer reflected on the previous ten
years of the church's struggle to render truthful confession and bear faithful
witness to the Gospel. He acknowledges that what was missing - from a
Christian point of view - was the kind of "large heartedness" displayed by
Christ himself. Tt was Christ who, according to the Scriptures, bore the
sufferings of all humanity in his own body as if they were his own, accepting
them by his own free will. Bonhoeffer notes that we are not Christ, nor are
we called to redeem the world by our own deeds and sufferings, since we are
not lords but instruments in the hand of the God of history. And while we
are not Christ, we may share in Christ's large hearledness with both freedom
and responsibility, demonstrating a real sympathy which springs from the
liberating and redeeming love of Christ for all who suffer since, "Mere waiting
and looking on is not Christian behavior." In other words, Christians are
called to sympathy, to acts of justice and mercy by the suffering of others for
whose sake Christ suffered; the One whose fellowship we share \vith them 9
Bonhoeffer concludes "'~th a remarkable pasage on the "view from below;'
asserting that the time has come for learning to see great events from the
perspective of "the outcast, the maltreated, the powerless, the oppressed, the
reviled - in short, from the perspective of those who suffer." For Christian
people, this perspective can occur \vithout either bitterness or envy, as a way
of seeing with new eyes, "matters great and small, strength and weakness,
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sorrow and joy, that our perception of generosity, humanity, justice, and
mercy should have become clearer, freer, less corruptible."'°
In The Cost of Discipleship, Bonhoeffer had already described the form of
life which characterizes the church as it is shaped by the Word incarnate in
Christ through the activity of the Spirit and daily prayer, mediating on the
Word, and bodily discipline.
To be conformed to the image of Jesus Christ is not an ideal of realizing
some kind of similarity with Christ which we are asked to attain. Itis not we
who change ourselves into the image of God. Rather, it is the very image of
God, the form of Christ, which seeks to take shape within us (Gal. 4:19). It
is Christ's own form which seeks to manifest itself in us. Christ does not
cease working in us until he has changed us into Christ's own image. Our goal
is to be shaped into the entire form of the incarnate, the crucified, and the
risen one. Christ has taken on human form. He became a human being like
us. In his humanity and lowliness -we recognize our own form. He became
like human beings, so that we would be like himY
Because Christ unites humanity to himself in the life of his Body, it is the
Holy Spirit who makes the words of Scripture "relevant" - in relation to the
reconciliation of God and the world - through the church's embodiment of
the reality of the incarnate Word in its language and life, "The truthfulness
which we owe to God must assume a concrete form in the world. Our speech
must be truthful, not in principle but concretely. A truthfulness which is not
concrete is not truthful before God."'2 However, the temptation to abstract
language, joined with desire for human autonomy, separates the church's
language from the concrete, visible form of life sustained by Christ's presence
in history, thus creating a form of "Christianity without Christ" which serves
only to stimulate more desire for abstract forms of religious "relevance."
Bonhoeffer rightly contends such strategies render words incapable of truthful
expression. His description speaks powerfully to our time.
It is a consequence of the wide diffusion of the public word through the
newspapers and wireless that the essential character and the limits of various
different words are no longer clearly felt and that, for example, the special
quality of the personal word is almost entirely destroyed. Genuine words are
replaced by idle chatter. Words no longer possess any weight. There is too
much talk. And when the limits of the various words are obliterated, when
words become rootless and homeless, then the word loses truth, and then
indeed there must almost inevitably be lying. When the various orders of life
no longer respect one another, words become untrue. 13
Bonhoeffer perceived that the temptation to make our lies true was
prompted by a kind of Christian, ecclesial self-preservation which produces
forms of popular "religion" that presumably appeal and correspond to the
needs of the individual human psyche. Such "privatized" religion represents
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a withdrawal of the church from the concrete, bodily affairs of public life,
thereby serving the limited purpose of "making individuals happy in the
depths of their being," but without asking the most decisive theological
question of "whether it is true, of whether it is the truth" revealed by God in
the person of Christ.
For it could be, of course, that while religion is a beautiful thing, it is not
true, that it is all a nice, pious illusion - but still an illusion. But whoever so
speaks [making the question of truth secondary] only sees religion from the
perspective of human beings and their needs, not from that of God and his
Only the one who has staked his or her life on Christ as the truth is
claims
in a position to judge whether Christ speaks and is the truth
Truth is
recognized only in the course of living it.'4
In Ethics, Bonhoeffer again took up the matter of the church's conformance
to the image of Christ - the truthful unity of Christian thought and action as a requirement for seeing, living, and speaking the truth according to reality,
the reconciliation of God and the world revealed in Christ. Such conformance
is achieved by neither establishing programs nor applying "Christian
principles," but is only realized in being drawn by divine grace into the form
of Jesus Christ through the ministry of Word and sacrament and by prayer
and action for justice. His words help us to see that if preachers are to address
moral issues such as tortue, their vision of God and the world must first be
illumined by the reality of crucified truth indwelling the church as that part of
humanity in which Christ has taken form in solidarity with the weak, the
humiliated, and the enemy to stand against violence, arbitrariness, and pride
of power.
We are sick and tired of Christian programmes and of the
thoughtless superficial slogan of what is called 'practical'
Christianity as distinct from dogmatic Christianity
The
primary concern is not with the forming of a world by plans
and programmes. Whenever they speak of forming [the
Scriptures] they are concerned only with the one form which
has overcome the world, the form ofJesus Christ But here
again is not a question of applying directly to the world the
teaching of Christ or what are referred to as Christian principles,
so that the world might be formed in accordance with these
For indeed in it is not written that God became an idea, a
principle, a programme, a universally valid proposition or a
law, but that God became man. This means that though the
form of Christ certainly is and remains one and the same, yet it
is willing to take form in the real man, that is to say, in quite
different gnises What Christ does is precisely to give effect to
reality. He affIrms reality
Whoever sees Jesus Christ does
indeed see the world and God in oneY
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CHRISTOPHER T. BOUNDS

Augustzne's Interpretatzon 0/ R!Jmans 7-14-25, Hzs Ordo
Salutis and His Consistent Beliif in a Christian's Victory
over Szn
The Apostle Paul declares in Romans 7:14-15, "We know that the law is
spiritual; but I am unspiritual, sold as a slave to sin. I do not understand
what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate to do."!
The history and development of Augustine of Hippo's exegesis of this
passage has received significant scholarly attention. 2 In his initial forays into
Pauline study in 394/395, Propositionsfrom the Epistle to the Romans, Augustine
interpreted Romans 7: 14-25 as a human being "under the law, prior to grace.'"
The "I" pictured here is the quintessential unregenerate person, who has
knowledge of the law of God, senses true guilt for sinfulness, longs for
deliverance, but is without the grace of Christ to overcome sin. In contrast,
the Christian "under grace," infused with the love of God, is victorious over
sin and "ceases to sin."4 In 396, Augustine reiterates his understanding in
Eighty Three Different Questions and in his work of 398, To Simplician on
Various Questions. 5
There is no hint of change in Augustine's basic interpretive approach to
Romans 7 until 411 in his treatise On the Merits and Remission ofSins, and on the
Baptism of Infants. In his examination of Job's righteousness, Augustine
compares Job to the person in Romans 7:19-24 who "delights in the law of
God after the inner man, while he sees another law in his members warring
against the law of his mind." Job is the type of individual who says, "The
good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now
ifI do that I would not, itis no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me."6
At this point, there is no inconsistency with Augustine's earlier teaching.
However, later in the treatise he will argue that Christians who live a life of
righteousness like Job are worthy of praise, but are not without sin and
therefore must pray regularly the Lord's Prayer "forgive us our trespasses."7
Augustine implicitly connects Christians "under grace" with the person of
Romans 7
20
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What is implied in 011 the l'vlerits becomes explicit by 415 in Augustine's
011 Alalls Perfectioll ill RighteoHslless, which sets forth the key seminal ideas of
his new interpretation of Romans 7 The person described by Paul in this
passage is one "under grace." The "divided self" pictured so poignantly by
tl1e Apostle is the Christian believer.' T~ater, in a series of sermons preached in
417, Augustine clarifies that the "I" in this passage is Paul speaking about
himself. Paul is testifying to his present Christian experience and providing a
description of every Christian life before the resurrection of the body.9 By
421 in AgaillSt TUJO Letters of the Pelagialls and in AgaillS! JHliali Augustine
acknowledges and repudiates completely his earliest interpretations of Romans
7 10 In 327, three years before his death, Augustine, writing his RetractiotlS,
renounces again his earliest position on Romans 7 as a description of an
unconverted person "under law" and reiterates his belief that this is Paul's
Christian testimony and the experience of every person "under grace."ll
Intimately tied to Augustine's exegesis of Roman's 7 is his ordo salHtis Of
order of salvation. In his earliest written work on Paul, Propo.ritiollS from the
Epz~ftle to the Romalls, Augustine uses his comments to articulate a theological
understanding of personal salvation in four stages. Indeed, this is the focus
of PropositiotlS. Interestingly, while Augustine changes his understanding of
Romans 7 as he grows older, and for that matter, his reading of Romans 911 and the doctrine of election, his ordo salHtis remains essentially the same
throughout his life. He articulates it dearly in his early theological work, uses
it as a reference point throughout his ministry as priest and bishop, and gives
it significant treatment in his later treatises. '2
In his ordo Augustine consistently maintains that a Christian is empowered
to walk in obedience to Christ through the infusion of love by the Holy
Spirit. He describes a normative Christian life as one free from outward or
willful sin. Even as his interpretation of Romans 7 changes, this basic
understanding of a Christian's life "under grace" does not, although it is
nuanced differently in his later thought. 13
The question arises: how can Augustine do this 'with his complete reversal
on Romans 7? If the Apostle Paul is describing his Christian life, and with
him all Christians, in verses 14-25, how can Augustine maintain a theology
of salvation in which a Christian is free from willful sin? The purpose of our
paper is to answer this question. To do so, we will first summarize Augustine's
ordo salNtis and highlight some nuances brought to his understanding in later
reflection. Next, we will examine how Augustine reconciles his later
interpretation of Romans 7:14-25 with his persistent teaching on a Christian's
outward compliance to the law. Then, we will look more specifically at the role
of will or consent in the Christian "under grace." Finally, we will conclude
with a few summary remarks.
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I. Augustine's Ordo SaJutis
Augustine in 394 identifies four basic stages in a person's experience of

salvation, subsequently carried throughout his ministry as priest and bishop:
a life "prior to the law," "under the law," "under grace," and "in peace."14
However, he acknowledges that some Christians may not pass through all
stages, such as the case of infant baptism in which a child moves from a life
"prior to the law" to one "in grace," bypassing the stage "under the law."15
He also sees his ordo sa/utis as an outline of the history of the church. First,
the church existed "prior to the law;' from the moment of the fall in the
Garden to God's appointment with the nation of Israel on Mt. Sinai. Second,
the church lived "under the law" from the revelation of God's law through
Moses to Christ's coming. Now, the church lives "under grace" through the
incarnate ministry of Jesus Christ. However, Augustine maintains that life
"under grace" is never absent in history, but is veiled and hidden. Before
Christ's incarnation, Old Testament saints had some knowledge of and saving
faith in Christ or they would not have been able to make prophecies about
him. Finally, the church will be "in peace" when it enters the resurrected state
in the eschatological age to come. 16
Specifically, because of original sin, Augustine believes every human being
is born into life "prior to the law." They live in ignorance of sin and follow
their carnal desires without the restraint of conscience or established
prohibitions. 1? He interprets the Apostle Paul's statement, ''And I was alive
once without the law," as indicative of Paul's early childhood before he could
reason, before he reached an age of accountability. IS
The second stage is a life "under the law." Here, through an awakened
conscience and the revelation of God's law, people recognize their sinfulness.
Knowledge of the law produces anxiety over their guilt and prepares them
for the grace of salvation. They learn how sinful they really are. They are aware
of the condemnation of God upon their lives and want to some extent to
live in accordance with the law, but are unable to do so. They are slaves to sin
and the fear of God. 19 They want to change, but the power of carnal desire is
too strong and they find greater pleasure in committing sin. Sin deceives
them continually "with its false sweetness."zo
Augustine believes a person is defeated at this stage "because he does not
yet love righteousness for the sake of God and for the sake of righteousness
itself. And so when he sees righteousness on the one hand and temporal
comfort on the other, he is drawn to the weight of temporal longing and
thus abandons righteousness, which he was trying to hold on to only in
order to have the comfort he now sees he will lose if he holds on to
righteousness."21 People "under law" may conform to the law, but only as
long as it is beneficial to them. The desires of the flesh may lead to obedience,
but only for selfish reasons. When keeping the law is no longer beneficial, a
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person discards it.
The only way humanity's sinful desires can be defeated is through a true
love of God and love of the commanded good. In the absence of real love,
carnal desire always triumphs. In the third stage of salvation "under grace,"
Augustine teaches that God gives the love of God to the human heart
through the infusion of the Holy Spirit, empowering the Christian to
"delight" in the law of God and walk in accordance to love. "X/hile Christians
still have desires of the flesh, and the flesh is in conflict with the Spirit, the
love of God triumphs over these desires so that believers do not obey them. 22
At this point, it may be helpful to catalogue chronologically some of
Augustine's key statements on life "under grace" to demonstrate his consistent
belief in a Christian's victory over willful sin. Augustine in his description of
the third stage dearly states in 395, "When this happens, even though certain
fleshly desires fight against our spirit while we are in this life, to lead us into
sin, nonetheless our spirit resists them because it is fixed in the grace and love
of God, and ceases to sin. For we sin not by having this perverse desire but
by consenting to it."23 In 398 in response to questions raised by his friend
Simplicius, he answers, "When grace forgives sin and infuses a spirit of
charily, righteousness ceases to be hard and becomes even pleasant."24 Speaking
about the perfection of righteousness possible in the present life and
experienced "under grace," he teaches in 415, "But whensoever he suffers not
sin to reign in his mortal body to obey it in the lusts thereof, and yields not
his members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin
it does not
reign, because its desires are not obeyed."2; In the heights of the Pelagian
debates of 422, Augustine affirms that the Apostles did not consent to the
lusts of the flesh and lived "under grace." He declares, "I do say that although
they were free from consent to depraved lusts, they nevertheless groaned
concerning the concupiscence of the Hesh, which they bridled by restraint
with such humility and piety, that they desired rather not to have it than to
subdue it."26 Then, in the most systematic account of his mature theology in
422, The Eflchiridiofl, Augustine describes the Christian in the third stage of
salvation: "But if God has regard to him, and inspires him with faith in
God's help, and the Spirit of God begins to work in him, then the mightier
power of love strives against the power of the Hesh, and although there is
still in man's own nature a power that fights against him (for his disease is
not completely cured), yet he lives the life of the just by faith, and lives in
righteousness so far as he does not yield to evil lust, but conquers it by the
love of holiness."27
\X!hile Augustine remains consistent in his teaching on a Christian "under
grace," as a life empowered to walk in love and not consent to sinful desires,
he does nuance some of the finer points of his teaching, particularly his
conception of sin and his understanding of the intensity of sinful desires.
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First, Augustine develops his definition of sin. In 395 Augustine
acknowledges that a Christian still experiences the lusts of the flesh, but does
not sin. At this point in his theology, he defines sin as the consent of the will
to obey, or to act according to sinful desire. Simply having sinful desires is not
personal sin. He states, "For we sin not by having this perverse desire but by
consenting to it."28 Elsewhere, he writes that God's condemnation docs not
rest upon the one, "engaged in battle, but on the one defeated in battle."29
However, by the opening decades of the fifth century, Augustine's
hamartiology expands. He begins to see sinful desire itself as personal sin
and in need of the absolution brought about through the Lord's Prayer:
"Forgive our debts, as we forgive our debtors;" as well as through ahnsgiving.
While he only sees it as venial sin and not mortal, it is still sin that a Christian
must bear until the resurrection of the body.30
Augustine comes to see sinful desire as sin because it falls short of the
perfect love of God and neighbor, which is the ultimate end of the law. A
Christian operates out of the love of God; the love of God enables a person's
obedience, but because of the desires of the flesh, love is not perfectY
Augustine states, "It is not the mere "doing" of a good thing that is not
present to him, but the "perfecting" of it. For in this, that he yields no
consent (to the desires of the flesh), he does good; he does good again, in
this, that he hates his own lust. But how to perfect the good is not present
to him; it will be, however, in that final state, when the concupiscence which
dwells in his members shall exist no more."32
Second, Augustine sees more clearly the intensity of sinful desire in
Christian life. Early in his theological thought, Augustine recognizes or
acknowledges concupiscence in the third stage, but does not give significance
to it. However, while writing The Confessions he begins to address the
psychological dynamics and intensity of fleshly desires in detail. They
command Augustine's attention in ways not seen in his earlier work."
Nevertheless, while Augustine paints concupiscence in the third stage with
greater intensity, he persistently maintains a Christian's victory over it.
In the fourth and final stage of salvation, a life is "in peace." This will take
place when the bodies of Christians afe resurrected in the age to come. Then,
there will be nothing in humanity that resists the love of God, but every part
will work harmoniously together. There will be the perfection of love in
which people will love God with all heart, soul, and mind. All human action
will embody the perfect love of God and neighbor. Sin and sinful desires will
be impossible to humanity, since they will be like God, having true freedom
- to do only what is in accordance with love. 34

II. Augustine's Later Interpretation of Romans 7:14-25
How does Augustine reconcile his consistent understanding of the
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Christian "under grace" with his later exegesis of Romans 7:14-25? As we
stated earlier, by 417 Augustine sees Romans 7 as the Apostle Paul's personal
testimony of Christian experience, as well as every individual in the third
stage of salvation. To answer this question, we must examine Augustine's
interpretation of this passage. His clearest and most thorough treatments are
Sermons 151-156, preached in 417 and two treatises written in 422, OnMamage
and Concupiscence and Against Two Letters of the Pelagians. 35
First, Augustine begins by reviewing Paul's teaching from Romans 3:20,
3:27, 4:13, 5:20, 6:14, and 7:4, establishing the fact that the law brings
knowledge of sin, and incites sin, but does not take it away. Because knowledge
of the law makes a person more sinful and is not able to deliver a person
from sin, Augustine is careful to defend the goodness of the law. The law
drives a person to seek God's grace. Only divine grace infusing love in the
human heart can set an individual free from sin. 36
SecQnd, Augustine interprets Romans 7:7-13 as the Apostle's personal
witness about his life "prior to the law" and "under the law." Paul's statement,
"For 1 was alive without the law once," refers to Paul's early childhood, before
his ability to reason, before an age of accountability. "But when the
commandments came, sin revived, but 1 died," addresses the time in the
Apostle's life when he became aware of the law, but was not able to keep it,
thereby becoming a transgressor. 37 More specifically, the phrase "sin revived"
refers to original sin in the Garden, passed down to all humanity, which
remains hidden and undetected, until the human heart recognizes it when it
encounters and balks at the law of God. Paul's statements, "For without law
sin is dead," and "I had not known sin but by the law, for 1 had not known
lust unless the law had said, 'Thou shalt not covet,'" conveys the profound
disruption knowledge of sin brings to life. Once sin revives, it becomes
"excessive" through the angst created in confrontation with the law. Continuing
to speak on the command not to covet, Paul testifies, "But the occasion being
taken, sin wrought in me by the commandment all manner oflust"38 Concupiscence
becomes stronger in it assertion of independence from the law.
Third, Augustine argues that Romans 7:14-23 is Paul's present Christian
testimony and all Christians "under grace." Verse 14 states, "For we know
that the law is spiritual, but 1 am carnal, sold as a slave to sin." Here, Augustine
notes the use of the present tense, "1 am," and not the past, "I was." Paul is
speaking for himself and his Christian experience. More specifically, the
declaration "1 am carnal" refers to Paul's physical body, which has not yet
experienced the resurrection. It is the same as saying, "1 am mortal." "Sold
under sin" further conveys the idea of a physical body not yet redeemed from
its corrupted state, a body that creates a "drag" upon the soul. Augustine
makes clear though, this is also the description of every Christian. However,
with Paul, Christians do not consent or obey the desires arising from the
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body's corrupted state. 39
Paul writes in verses 15, "For what I would, that do I not; but what I hate,
that do I." Augustine does not understand this statement to involve any
external act by the Apostle, rather an internal motion in the heart. In essence,
this is Paul's admission to concupiscence. He covets or has sinful desires
arising from his corrupted body. However, he does not consent or obey these
desires. These are desires that wage inside of him. He despises them, longs to
be free from them, but finds them nevertheless in his life. Augustine
elaborates, ''We shouldn't take what he said, 'It is not what I want to that I
do, but what 1 hate, that is what I do' as meaning that he wanted to be chaste,
and was in fact an adulterer; that he wanted to be kind, and was in fact cruel
That's not the sense in which we should understand (this passage) .. but in
what sense? 'I want not to covet, and yet 1 do covet."'40
In verse 16 Paul continues, "If then 1 do that which 1 would not, 1
consent to the law that it is good." Here, Augustine develops further his
previous thought. What does Paul do that he "would not"? He has sinful
desires. The Apostle then recognizes that the law wills that there be no
coveting, no concupiscence and he agrees with the law. He wants what the law
wants. Augustine explains, ''And yet what I don't want (desire, coveting,
concupiscence) occurs in me. What the law doesn't want, I join the law in not
wanting; what it doesn't want, I don't want either; so I give my consent to
the law." 41
Because there is concupiscence in his physical body, but Paul does not
consent or give into these desires, the Apostle states in verse 17, "Now, then,
it is no more 1 that do it, but sin that dwells in me."42 His body suffers from
concupiscence, but not his actions. He does not obey his sinful desires.
Therefore, he does not covet, but his body does. Augustine states, "For 'it is
not I that do it," cannot be better understood than he does not consent to set
forth his members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin. For if he
lusts and consents and acts, how can he be said not to do the thing himself?"43
For Augustine, verse 18 is the crux to understanding Paul's testimony.
This is the "clear" passage, through which the more difficult passages of this
section are to be read. Paul declares in verse 18, "For I know that in me (that
is, in my flesh) dwells no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how
to perfect that which is good I find not." Augustine argues that Paul is
empowered to do the good. He is able to walk in obedience to God and
follow the law of God, but because concupiscence exists in his body, his
actions are not perfect. This accounts for the Apostle's precision in words.
Paul does not say "to do good" is beyond his will to do, but "how to perfect
it" is in the present life. 44
For Augustine verse 18 holds up the ideal action as a basis for judgment
of any act. The ideal is an action performed in perfect love of God without
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any constraints of sinful desite. Augustine states, "for the good is perfonned
itnperfecdy when one covets, even if consent to the evil of coveting is
withheld." Complete action, "perfect" action is by contrast action unifonnly
supported by a person's de site to act in the love of God. 45 Not only does
Augustine contend that this is the correct reading of the verse in which the
infInitive "to perfect" appears, but he assumes the other ways of expressing
action in Romans 7: 14-25, carry itnplicidy the sense of acting in conformity to
the ideal. So, for example, when Paul states in 7: 15 that he does what he hates,
Augustine interprets this to mean that Paul performs what the law demands,
but not without the presence of fleshly desite. Sinful desite does not interfere
with his actions, but with the purity of his intentions. 46
Augustine believes Paul's declaration in verse 18 is amplified in verses 1921. The Aposde states "For the good that I would, I do not: but the evil
which I would not, that I do. Now, if I do that which I would not, it is no
more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me. I fInd then the law, when I would
act, to be good to me; for evil is present with me." Again, Paul finds the law
good when he consents to do what the law would have him to do; inasmuch
as his consent falls short of its perfect keeping, as a result of concupiscence,
evil is present even in his consent"?
In the first part of verse 22, Paul testifies, "For I delight in the law of God
after the inward man." Augustine confesses that this testimony is key to his
transition of seeing Romans 7:14-25 as a Christian "under grace." Only a
person "under grace" delights in God's law. A person "prior to the law" is
ignorant of it; a person "under the law" fears the consequences of breaking
the law and is in servitude to it. However, the Christian "under grace" delights
in it. This delight comes from realizing the end of the law - love, made
possible by the grace of God through the Holy Spitit. In it is love that cheers
and gratifIes the believer.48
The second part of verse 22 and verse 23 continues, "but I see another law
in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into
captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." Augustine again interprets
this other "law" to be concupiscence in his fallen body. "Bringing me into
captivity" addresses the flesh, the body that has a "morbid carnal affection."
Augustine states, "In so far then, as there is now this waiting for the
redemption of our body, there is also in some degree still existing something
in us which is captive to the law of sin."49 This captivity is in the flesh and not
in the mind, in the emotions, but not in consent. 50
In verse 24, Paul declares, "0 wretched man that I am! Who will deliver
me from the body of this death? The grace of God, through Jesus Christ our
Lord." Augustine comments, "What are we to understand by such language,
but that our body, which is undergoing corruption, weighs heavily on our
souls? In the resurrection there will be full liberation." 51 Although the actual
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law of sin partly holds th(; flesh in captivity, still it does not reign in the
Christian life because a Christian does not obey its desires.
Finally, in verse 25, Paul concludes, "So then with the mind I myself serve
the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin." Augustine again drives
home his point that Paul, and by inference, every Christian, serves the law of
God by refusing to obey the law of sin. However, the Apostle serves the law
of sin by having the desires of the flesh, from which he is not free entirely,
although he does not give in to them.s2 Augustine states, "To wit, with the
flesh, the law of sin, by lusting; but with the mind, the law of God, by not
consenting to that lust."53 Augustine states elsewhere, "Both the law of God
in the mind, and the law of sin in the flesh. I both take delight in this one
(mind), and at the same time 1 feel lust there (flesh). But I am not overpowered;
it tickles my fancy, it lays siege to me, it hammers at the door, it tries to take me
away, but not it does not (overpower)."54

III. The Role of Will or Consent in People "Under Grace"
As we have now seen, while Augustine's exegesis of Romans 7 shifts
from a person "under law" who cannot walk in true righteousness to a
Christian "under grace" who can walk in obedience to the law, but cannot
perfect it, nevertheless, his later interpretation conforms to his basic orda
salutis held throughout his ministry.
Now, the question must be asked: what enables people "under grace" to
walk in obedience to God, to serve the law of God in their mind and not
consent to the desires of the flesh? AUlo'Ustine's answer: the love of God
shed abroad in the human heart by the Holy Spirit. The love of God enables
obedience, empowering true consent to the law of God.
Augustine identifies three factors in the exercise of human will: suggestion,
delight, and consent. 55 First, a suggestion is any idea that comes to a person's
mind through personal reflection, random thinking, or bodily senses.
Therefore, when a person is told she needs to go back to school if she wants
to work at a particular company, or an individual has a chance idea to start a
new business while talking to his wife about a haircut, or a teenager considers
eating an ice cream cone after seeing a Baskin-Robbins advertisement, they
have experienced suggestion. More specifically, AUIc,'Ustine sees the law of
God as suggestion as it comes to human beings in the law given to Adam in
the Garden and to Moses onMt. Sinai, in the law summari:-oed by Jesus
Christ, and in the law of reason and conscience. 56
N ext, Augustine teaches that each suggestion encounters internal desires
already existing in the human mind. In response to a suggestion presented
to the mind, strong feelings of attraction or aversion may arise, motivating a
person to move in one direction or another; or it may meet with indifference,
creating little inclination to action; or it may encounter conflicting desires,
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causing internal division within the mind about what to do. 57 For example,
when a person encounters a suggestion to eat an ice cream cone from a .
Baskin-Robbins commercial, strong feelings of sensual pleasure may arise, or
stimulate a deep fear of gaining weight, or cause internal turmoil if pleasure
and fear are both persuasive to the mind.
From whence do these desires come? AUf,'Ustine identifies two places:
love and the force ofhabit. 58 First and most basic, Augustine believes human
desires have their origin in love - either the love of God or the love of self.59
By creating humanity in the divine image, God made people to love God,
which then enables them to turn toward their neighbor in self-giving love,
and truly love themselves for God's sake. However, because of original sin,
love has been corrupted, becoming self-centered, seeking its private interest
above all else. In fallen humanity, desire or delight, are all manifestations of a
person's egoist love. Augustine calls these "desires of the flesh" and
"concupiscence." All human desires or delights have self-love as their basis,
rather than the perfect love of God. 60
Second, Augustine believes some desires are built and fortified by habit. A
habit begins when a suggestion arouses pleasure that leads to consent. Then,
the experience of gratification fuels the pleasure desire, so that when the same
suggestion comes again, even greater desire arises, leading to action. As a
person continues to consent to the pleasure inclination, the pleasure desire
increases in strength, forcing other competing desires (fear, caution) to recede
to the background, forming a habit almost impossible to break. 61
Finally, Augustine believes a suggestion that arouses the strongest delight
leads to consent of the will, which results in action. He believes human
beings consent to what they ultimately want. Humanity does whatever is
their strongest desire. Human consent follows the desire most aroused by a
suggestion. G2 For example, in the suggestion of eating an ice cream cone,
Augustine believes a person will consent to whatever the strongest desire is.
H the pleasure desire is stronger, she will eat the ice cream; if the fear of
gaining weight is stronger, she will abstain; and if both are powerful, she will
have some inner turmoil, but will eventually do whatever the strongest desire is.
As such, the key for Augustine in the sequence of suggestion - delight consent is delight or desire. Accordingly, humanity in the stage "prior to the
law" cannot begin to fulfill the law of God. They cannot "delight" in the true
love of God and neighbor. Instead, their "delight" is completely self-focused.
Because all human desire in this stage is self-focused, defined by
"concupiscence," the act arising from 'willful consent will always be selfish. As
such, they do not keep the law of God."
In the stage "under the law;' humanity by God's grace begins to recognize
a need to keep the law of God. They see the need to love God and neighbor.
They may begin to desire to walk in true love. 64 As such, a new desire enters
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into the mix. However, when the suggestion of God's law comes by
instruction or reason, concupiscence rises to the fore, dominating any desire
to walk in divine love, so that they are not able to keep the la,'1. Their consent
follows their fleshly desires. Even when they act in outward conformity to the
law, concupiscence is at the root. In wanting to avoid punishment, earn
praise, or gain some personal reward, they act out of egoist love in the
outward performance of the law. Only when a person wants God's will out
of the love of God alone is the law kept. 65 Thus, in The COJZjessiotIJ Augustine
testifies of his life before conversion as one "under law" in which he wants to
follow God, but is not able to relinquish his fleshly desires that bind him to
the world. His fleshly desires are stronger than his desire for God. 66
In the third stage "under grace," Augustine teaches that God infuses
divine love or "delight for the law" by the Holy Spirit into human life. This
comes as a gift of God to a person. Therefore, when the suggestion of the
law comes, it encounters the internal desire to love God, which subordinates
any other contrary desire or inclination, leading to a person's consent. God
empowers a person with love, so that this delight, this pleasure, this inclination,
"draws" or "leads" human consent. Divine love becomes the strongest desire
or delight in a Christian and the human will consents to this love. \lV'hat the
law commands, love seeks and obtains by divine grace."
However, as already been intimated, because concupiscence resists love
and consent to the good, the good accomplished by consent is marred. It is
not perfect love. Nevertheless, the inclinations against which a person "under
the law" struggles are now overcome because a higher inclination, love of
God, has subordinated them.
More specifically, in Romans 7:14-25 Augustine sees two conflicting
delights. The fIrst, which is the consequence of original sin is concupiscence.
Human beings find pleasure or delight in the wrong things. This is the law
of sin. The second, which is a result of God's grace infusing the heart with
love by the I Ioly Spirit is delight in the law of God. Augustine makes clear in
his interpretation of this passage that a person "under grace" can consent to
the good and yet not be free of conflict. Because concupiscence resists love
and consent to the good, the good accomplished by consent is marred. It is
not perfect 10ve. 6d
Augustine states, '~'\nd, without the gift of God-that is, without the
Holy Spirit, through whom love is shed abroad in our hearts-the law may
bid but it cannot aid. Moreover, it can make of man a transgressor, who
cannot then excuse himselfbv pleading ib'1lorancc. For appetite reigns where
the love of God does not
(but) if a man begins to be led by the Spirit of
God, then the mightier power of love struggles against the power of the
flesh. And although there is still in man a power that fights against him-his
infirmity being not yet fully healed-yet the righteous man lives by faith and
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lives righteously in so far as he does not yield to evil desires, conquering them
by his love of righteousness." 69

Conclusion
In conclusion, while Augustine's interpretation of Romans 7:14-25
undergoes revision in his work as priest and bishop, his basic understanding
of a person "under law" and Christian "under grace" does not. Augustine
consistently maintains that a person "under law" is unable to keep the law,
because of "delight" for self-love. The Christian "under grace" is able to
consent to the law and be victorious over the desires of the flesh, because of
"delight" in God's love.
Augustine's teaching stands in a long historical line of witness to the
expectation of a Christian's victory over willful sin and a life defined by the
love of God and neighbor. Augustine in his doctrinal treatises believes
Christians are able to overcome their sinful desires, because of the love of
God shed abroad in their hearts. Because Christians "under grace" have true
love, love subdues all other desires, enabling them to walk in love. While it is
not perfected love, it nevertheless is love made manifest in heart and life.
Christopher T. Bounds is associate professor of theology at Indiana Wesleyan
University in Marion, Indiana.
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Consolation as Theme in Luther's Sermons and
Correspondence: Insights into his Theological Ethics

I. Introduction

Various themes have been identified as foundational for Luther's ethical
program. Hegel praised Luther asserting that "the essence of the Reformation
[is]: Man is in his very nature destined to be free.'" He also stressed, "Freedom
of the spirit had its beginnings in Luther."2 Peering through this set of
lenses, freedom is the theme with which Luther leaves behind the late Middle
Ages and ushers in the modern era and with it a relentless religious
individualism, part of maturing Geist. Harnack had the same idealistic,
historicist mindset, seeing in Luther a new "evolution" to disposition ethics.'
Althaus, along with a host of theologians, has identified the theme of
justification as central to Luther's ethical thought and break with the Medieval
Church.
Luther's ethics is determined in its entirety, in its starting point
and in all its main features, by the heart and center of his
theology, namely, by the justification of the sinner through
the grace that is shown in Jesus Christ and received through
faith alone. Justification by faith determines Christian ethics
because, for the Christian, justification is both the
presupposition and the source of the ethicallife. 4
Antecedent to centering the reformer's ethics on his doctrine of justification,
recent Luther scholarship involves the scrupulous and wide-ranging activityone beyond the scope of this study-of establishing where the reformer's
theological pedigree begins. The debate of this crucial question will be largely
set aside; but suffice here to add that eminent church historian, the late Heiko
Oberman, ofTiibingen and Arizona State Universities, was an innovative
and influential proponent of situating Luther within the context of late
medieval Christian theology by attempting to show important lines of
continuity between the reformer and his medieval heritage.s Dr. Berndt Hamm,
36
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who focuses on the intellectual history of late medieval and Reformation
Germany at the University of Erlangen-Nurnberg, has been another highprofile advocate making an even stronger case for this continuity." In this
same vein and after a close study of the theology and rhetorical style of
Luther's letters of consolation, Dr. Cte Mennecke-Haustein at the University
of Bonn, concludes in explicit terms:
The consolation needs of the people of this time is almost
limitless, it arises out of the situation of the existence of disease
and death, economic and social insecurity, the arbitrary mercy
of various authorities, and the religious uncertainty concerning
the state of grace and one's eternal fate. The late-Medieval Age
suffering, Anfechtung, and consolation literature variously
consider this. While Luther accepts this theme, and indeed the
consolation letters explain the most important task of theology,
it is to be seen as an element of "continuity" in the "break"
between the late-:Middle Age and reformation. The consolation
letters of the reformer can be principal witnesses when it comes
to accurately describing this.'
I will discuss suffering, Anfechtung, and consolation soon enough, but
instead of using Luther's correspondence to track his trajectory between the
late medieval church and the Reformation, I instead want to investigate the
theme of consolation 8 contained in a broad selection of his sermons and
letters from the standpoint of theological ethics." First, I contend that the
special, inseparable connection between God's work of justification and
Luther's treatment of consolation is that God's love for the hurting soul is
operative in both. Second, that while each consoling sermon or compassionate
letter is inadequate on its own to serve as a basis for understanding the
reformer's moral framework, we can instead look at a "whole" these pieces
may construct. Thus, my focus will be more upon the ethical norms contained
in T,uther's consolatory homiletical practice and correspondence, to gain insights
into his theological ethics from a correlation of component parts, as it were,
than to assess his struggle against the spirit of the late medieval church as he
encountered it. The goal of dus essay is not to analyze the continuity between
the reformer and the late medieval church nor is it to emphasize a revolutionary
nature of his ideas and pastoral approach. Instead, it is to indicate how his
theme of consolation is a principal witness to his ethical comnLitment that
takes on the appearance of an ethic of responsibility. Some may question if
this assessment is possible or they may say dlis results in imposing a modern
category of ethics onto the reformer. After all, he wrote little about such
questions as "\Vhat is the structure of the responsible self?" or "by what
moral calculus shall I determine my personal responsibility in dlis situation?"
His focus was instead on the more practical and theolot,>ical features of Christ,
salvation, sin, and the sacraments. Despite that, in investigating Luther's

38

I

The Asbury Tournai

64/2 (20()9)

theme of consolation and questioning the presence of an ethic of
responsibility one has to reconstruct Luther's line of thought from scattered
writings that do not explicidy deal with issues of responsibility.
The Reformation, as Luther occasionally called it in reference to the entirety
of his work,IO was a reassertion of the Christian estimation of the supreme
importance of the individual. In large part it marked a return to the interiority
of Christianity and a reassertion of the essentially spiritual character of its
point of view, more so than some movements within medieval piety and
mysticism were able to achieve and imbue into the masses. The Protestant
doctrine of "justification by faith alone" is a theological application of the
ethical principle that the moral situation hinges not upon what one does, but
upon what one is; upon the attitude of one's will and the bent of one's
character. It is what one is that needs to be jus titled by grace through faith.
Luther's continuity with this point of view and his attempts to restore a
more consistent spiritual ethos with dIe New Testament imperative cast him
as the theological radical of the sixteenth century. Undergirding the reforming
and ministerial activities in which Luther participated were his theological
ethics. Before beginning to investigate this, we must first stop to consider the
ministerial task he took on that gave expression to his ethics. In order to
understand the theme of consolation embedded in Christian ethical texts it
is necessary to comprehend the complex religious and cultural circumstances
in which they are formed.

II. The Culture of Distress, Death and Care in Sixteenth Century
Western Europe
Prior to Sigmund Freud, the study of suffering and death belonged
primarily to theology and philosophy. It was not until the nineteenth century
that the experience and portrayal of dying and despondence entered into
conversation with psychology and the interpretation of theology as
anthropology began. In so doing, consolation faced as much modern hostility
as religion itself, giving rise to thc ideas that "[i]n religion man seeks
contcntment"l1 and that religion essentially ±illds its basis in the human need
for consolationY What must be remembered with regard to the nineteenth
century's experiential and psychological Zeizgei-rtand its projection of religion
as consolation is dut dlese views were the result of investigations into what
the common person understood by religion and his or her very narrow
internal expressions of religion. Moreover, this era failed to produce evidence
to sustain the claims that God/ consolalion is a psychological crutch to support
people'S inability to cope with life's disappointments, or that belief in God
arises from the common person's incapacity to understand physical
phenomena. It offered no convincing proof to explain how the religious
consolation offered at d,e religious intersection of the individual and pestilence-
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ridden society in the early sixteenth century was a contrivance or failed.
Long recognized as one of the watersheds in European history, historians
blame the cycle of plague epidemics (bubonic, septicaemic, and pneumonic)
as the cause of various divergent consequences ranging from despondence
and an obsession with the macabre to economic restructuring and the birth
of Renaissance humanism. The great social, religious, and personal disruption
associated with plagues makes the late Middle Ages population's desire for
advance warning about death and the need for consolation very
understandable. Nearly a third of Western Europe perished, and many cities
experienced a loss of almost half their people. Transfers in choice of burial
site, bequests to new religious groups, and questions of how one manages
oneself upon diagnosis are dramatic evidences of social and religious changes
in this period. In this culture of distress and death, what were the contours
of the pre-reformation ministry of care to which Luther responded?

A. Ars moriendi
French medievalist and cultural historian, Philippe Aries, summarized the
sophisticated preparations associated with the ars moriendi (the art of dying)
literature and iconography that provide unique insights into the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries' experience of death and sufferingY Nearly 300 ars moriendi
manuscripts survive, 20 percent of which are block books that suggest the
great consolatory importance of this subgenre of conduct literature in late
medieval and early modem thought.!4 The greatest fear of this era was that
once the pestilence was contracted, one would die alone and abandoned.
Devout folk considered sudden death to be one of many evils from which
they should pray for deliverance.!;
The catechetical questions posed to the dying person and traditional prayers
of the Medieval Church acknowledge a link between warning, preparation,
and consolation.!6 People wanted to prepare and to have a "good death" (not
to be confused with euthanasia). This required very specific preparations.
Dying followed prescribed gestures routinized by old customs: one awaited
death lying down with various hand postures, sometimes the head oriented
to the east (facing Jerusalem), the hands crossed, and the face turned up to
heaven. The ars moriendi then gave instruction on grieving and reconciling
oneself with loved ones, relatives, companions, and helpers. Grief occurred
for both sides; those about to be bereaved needed to express their grief over
imminent loss, and the dying person needed to mourn his or her loss of the
world. A measure of suffering was an acceptable part of human dying, was
short-lived, and not to be denied or obscured. But the Black Death,per se, was
not the primary impetus behind the ars moriendi. The exceedingly high mortality
rates among the clergy necessitated a more prominent participation of the
laity in the preparation for death, that of a friend, and their own. Dying was
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a very public preparation and ceremony took place in the bedchamber of the
dying which was entered freely, by relatives, friends, servant, and children. In
essence, the ars moriendi facilitated the process for the dying, for the priest and
pastor, and the laity.
Nonetheless, Dr. Carter Lindberg, Professor Emeritus of Church History
at Boston University, avers that the traditional symbols of security for the
people of the late 11iddle Ages were rocked at their roots. He emphasizes,
"[t]he shortness of life was never far from people's mincls," which is an echo
of Johan Huizinga, "[N]o other epoch has so much stress as the expiring
Middle Ages on the thought of death."l7 Tn effect, to borrow a recent thesis
from Princeton Theological Seminary's Dr. Scott Hendrix, people in this era
were primed to listen to the "re-Christianizing" message of the Reformation
in a new way. IS Comparing Luther with other late medieval ars maniendi
contributors, Jarecl Wicks, S. j., concludes that,
Luther did not first discover such interior trials, but he prescnted
thcm with more depth and refinement than was the case in
existing pastoral guidance.
One's worthiness and disposition
is a marginal matter, perhaps a snare, for what matters is to
believe true what God declares and shows forth in sign. \\!ill
one trustingly accept God's veracity and let Him make one safe
from enemy attacks?
The malignant images of death, sin,
and hell have just one remedy. They are dissipated hy him who
is for us sheer life, grace, and election. The sacraments reveal
and apply, not Jesus' offering to God, but God's astounding
gift to individual believers.
All in all, in 151 <) Luther laid the
hasis for renewing the Christian service of the dying. Most
significantly he would ground this ministry in tlle central saving
work of Jesus Christ and in his sacramental gift, which does
not exclude the company of those whom he has already drawn
into his sphere oflife and love. 19
Arguing more recently, and after an extensive analysis of the an morlendi
and German Reformation authors' books on dying (Sterbebttscher), religious
studies professor Austra Reinis of Missouri State University acknowledged,
"The emphasis on the sacraments, in particular, on theological discussion of
the sacraments in the context of instruction on dIe art of dying, is Luther's
most significant departure from the late medieval ars moriendi.""il It is from
within this framework that the reformer ministered to and encouraged the
dying and despondent to receive the sacraments with joy and confidence,
assuring them of tl1eir salvation and that their deatl1, sin and hell are overcome
in Christ's passion. Dr. Reinis finishes her work stressing that this certainty
of one's salvation "represents a radical departure from the arT mon-endi, which
taught that only through proper preparation could one receive the forgiveness
of sins offered in the sacraments."21
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B. The Cura Animarum as an Ethic of Care
To say that pastoral care (cura animarum-cure of soulsZZ) was essential for
Luther is as incisive as saying that mathematics is essential for Cambridge
theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking. The reformer's books and tracts,
sermons and commentaries and letters were hammered out on the anvil of
pastoral responsibility. While some may presuppose a "pestilence ethic"23
serving as a moral-action-guide for Luther's cure of souls, his minis tty of
consolation extends far beyond situations involving plague and the care of
people facing immanent death. His pastoral contact included those caught in
the grips of suffering and distress, many of whom felt abandoned to their
own weaknesses and the onslaught of desperate feelings of woe, and many
who felt the pangs of conscience and questioned the authenticity of their new
faith as Protestants. Lutheran theologian Dr. Oswald Bayer'S characterization
of Luther's ethics as an extension of his pastoral care is spot on the mark:
"For all the differences in his addtesses, forms of addtess and ways of
expression, for all the different themes and issues, one thing remains certain:
in everything, including his ethics, Luther was a pastoral counselor."24
The reformer observed individuals who were without any great measure
of confidence in the effectiveness of penitential piety and/ or in divine aid;
penitents were anything but consoled and God seemingly withdtew himself.25
He held priests responsible for this in The Babylonian Captiviry of the Church
(1520), "Therefore, as the priests are, so let their ministry and duty be. For a
bishop who does not preach the gospel or practice the cure of souls-what is
he but an idol in the world [I Cor. 8:4] who has nothing but the name and
appearance of a bishop?"26
Others, of the most ardent pastoral concern to Luther, were those whose
consciences were ravaged by unbelief and absolute dtead with regard to their
status before God. These lacked an assurance of salvation and thus faced-to
borrow from Otto's classic discussion of numinous (religious) feelings-the
"'awefulness,' the tremendum [of God], for which 'Wrath,' 'Fire,' 'Fury,' are
excellent ideograms."z7 To describe such a conscience in havoc, Luther
employed the term Anfechtung referring to, on the one hand-from the
heavenly standpoint-a trial sent by God to test and sttengthen the believer's
faith, or an attack by the devil to desttoy the believer. On the other handfrom the human standpoint-it is analogous to Kierkegaardian "Angst"28
but without any specific English equivalent. It is a "feeling response," whose
content is terror and structure is dtead toward God. One discerns it as a
tormented experience of a guilty conscience. It is all of human doubt, panic,
and desperation that drive the soul to believe that one's guilt is greater than
God's desire to forgive. 29
This is where Luther demonsttates the cure of souls par excellence. In his
estimation, only "the sure and certain Word" of the Gospel was able to save
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one from such distress and despair and bring peace. 30 Moreover, the restoration
of peace was evidence of God's affirmation of his grace and the effectual
power of the means of grace. For the reformer, the care of souls was the
shepherding, interpreting, enabling love of God-all in the context of biblebased care-revealed in Jesus Christ, represented pastorally, and lived out in
Christian community.31 Reformation scholar Dr. James Kittelson of Luther
Seminary in St. Paul, Minnesota, elevated this as Luther's most important
motivation when he said, "[a]bove all the care of souls, but not the church
as such, was the driving force in Luther's personal development and in his
career as friar, professor, theologian, and even reformer."32
In Luther's including the medieval conscience as a central territory of spiritual
battle, he targets a new dimension of spiritual care, a new breadth and depth
in the cure of souls. Notice how he unpacks Paul's argument in Lectures on
Galatians. Here he refers to those who have committed themselves to the cure
of souls at the deepest level as "instructors of conscience." These are primarily
preachers and teachers who understand the Law/Gospel dialectic and those
among the priesthood of believers who come into contact with human life
with the desire to lead the afflicted to the place of healing and full realization
of God's grace. 33 Luther's ministry of the cure of souls was a ministry of
consolation and encouragement that carried forward his theme of justification
by grace.
The reformer also knew that life-and-death situations reveal what people
really believe. He equally knew that the Scriptures and orthodox doctrine have
the possibility of giving what they describe. The function of consolation is
timid,
also to give to people what it describes. "In order to comfort
dismayed, troubled consciences, [Christ says] 'Come to me, all who labor and
are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest.' Here we are called to come to this
consolation, to the gospel."34
To take stock a little, the account I have been developing suggests that the
reformer's response to the sixteenth century culture and experience of suffering
and death was for the disturbed conscience of the sinner to hear the comforting
word of the Gospel. The ancient consolation literature gave comfort with the
firm and constant reference to the immortality of the soul and the unvarying
reminder that death had no penal character to it.35 The Greeks drew comfort
from the hope of a noble death, Judaism in the nearness of God as expressed
by the Psalter. 36 Luther saw that consolation placed the petrified soul on the
receiving end of care and hope, he also saw that the doctrine of justification
provided the mind with a clear resolution between law and gospel; both
served to construct a defense against the perennial spiritual terror of his age.
The "re-Christianization" and awareness that Luther helped to bring aboutthat God's name comforts 37-also had a comparable effect upon the
perception of death. Whereas death was once a Stygian foe in the medieval
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church, the reformer made it into a friend, or at least something that need not
be feared as much.
When plague hit Wittenberg, Elector John urged the professors to leave.
Instead of goiog to J ena, Luther stayed on iosisting that, "when people are
dying, they most need a spiritual ministry which strengthens and comforts
their consciences by word and sacrament and in faith overcomes death,"38 a
person "is thus responsible before God for his neighbor's death."39 To be
sure, Luther's stay communicates an iodelible message. It expresses in the
strongest terms possible that the cure of souls as an ethic of care requires
unwavering moral responsibility. Dr. Theo Boer of the Protestant Theological
University, The Netherlands, recendy put forth, "Through justification by
faith alone human beiogs are freed to become ethical subjects and to bear true
moral responsibility."40 However, before we can reflect on the relation between
Luther's doctrioe of justification and the concept of responsibility, we will be
well served to consider his theme of consolation in his sermons and
correspondence and to discern how they may elucidate an ethic of responsibility.

III. Luther's Ministry of Consolation
It need scarcely be said that the theological issue of a spiritually salutary
death has always been a central characteristic of pastoral concern. Afrer the end
of the Middle Ages, iostructions for Christians prepariog for death continued
to be written either as a subsection oflarger theological and pastoral manuals,
or, less frequendy, as iodividual treatises. In Luther's writings, his iostruction
on consolation primarily appears io various sermons and letters; it is not
confined to anyone particular section of his collected writings. Here is where
he had an impact upon iodividual Christian inwardness. This is where a
spiritual leader strives to form a Christian people; here is where the pastor!
theologian iofluences the moral qualities possessed by a person, a group, or
community, where people are directed toward moral excellence and the good.
Again, my ioterest is to iovestigate the reformer's theme of consolation as it
carries forward his theology of justification and to identify what iosights the
theme provides into his theological ethics.

A. Sermons
The funeral sermon was a public declaration that the departed had obtained
salvation. Lutheran funeral sermons of the sixteenth century intended for
both clerical and popular audiences to receive iostruction and to console the
grieving. "In this way their vivid accounts of sickbed and death continued the
tradition of the ars manendi of the late Middle Ages, which had also stressed
the importance of a blessed death."41 Unlike the Lutherans, the Reformed
rejected most funeral ceremonial, iocluding the preachiog of funeral sermons.
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"A Sermon On Preparing to Die"42 (1519) contains several preparatory
stages (twenty points) for death, has a quasi-vigil tone about it, and forms a
practical, guided imagery or a final mental construct much like the ars moriendi
for the soon-to-be-departed. Whether the "closeness of death" refers to the
plague and to the fact that people have come to a point of desiring a sudden
death which was formerly a source of great fear~r perhaps to an atmosphere
of anxiety that surrounds death and the gruesome block renderings depicting
death in the ars moriendi and architecture that may have taken hold of the
culture-is unclear.43 What is clear is that Luther wants to make sure that the
focal point of death is Christ.
You must look at death while you are alive and see sin in the
light of grace and hell in the light of heaven, permitting nothing
to divert you from that view.
You must not view or ponder
death in yourself or in your nature, nor in those who were
killed by God's wrath and were overcome by death. If you do
that you will be lost and defeated with them. But you must
resolutely turn your gaze, the thoughts of your heart, and all
your senses away from this picture and look at death closely
and untiringly only as seen in those who died in God's grace
and who have overcome death, particularly in Christ and then
also in all his saints. In such pictures death will not appear
terrible and gruesome. No, it will seem contemptible and dead,
slain and overcome in life. For Christ is nothing other than
sheer life, as his saints are likewise. The more profoundly you
impress that image upon your heart and gaze upon it, the
more the image of death will pale and vanish of itself without
struggle or battle. Thus your heart will be at peace and you will
be able to die calmly in Christ and with Christ, as we read in
Revelation [14:13], ''Blessed are they who die in the Lord ChriSt. 44
Notice Luther's use of the imperatival must. Not only did he want to
provide some practical evangelical pastoral assistance at the deathbed, he also
wanted to impart a sense of responsibility to maintain one's gaze upon
Christ. This is also accomplished in his fIrst Invocavit sermon, March 9, 1522
(the first of eight exhortations preached at Wittenberg to school his hearers
in the understanding of how they are responsible to live now that God had
made them Christians); it too places responsibility on the Christian to prepare
for death and to focus on Christ. Luther underscores that:
The summons of death comes to us all, and no one can die for
another. Everyone must fight his [or her] own battle with
death by himself [or hersel~, alone. We can shout into another's
ears, but everyone must himself [or herself] be prepared for
the time of death, for r will not be with you then, nor you with
me. Therefore, everyone must himself [or herself] know and
be armed with the chief things which concern a Christian. And
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these are what you, my beloved, have heard from me many
days ago. 45
Systematic and ecumenical theologian, Dr. Gerhard Sauter, at the University
of Bonn, also senses the Christian responsibility to console others in his
treatment of the sermon. He paraphrases the reformer's thrust, "Have you
We
forgotten your responsibility for your weaker brothers and sisters?
must prepare others
to stand before God and
to account authentically
for themselves.
This very responsibility before God forbids us from living
in such a way that we withdraw into ourselves, behaving in an isolated, selfenclosed manner."4/; True, Luther is constantly turning people outside of
themselves into the world.
Funeral sermons focus on the resurrection of Christ and its promise to
Christians, who in the sleep of death await the resutrection. Luther preached
funeral sermons for Frederic the Wise in 1525 and his brother, the Elector,
Duke John of Saxony in 1532. The sermons have a self-sustaining, pragmatic
component; one that relies on a future "fact" of the resutrection and which
thereby provides consolation rooted in hope.
Learn to comfort yourselves with these words and instill in
your hearts the fact that it is far more certain that Duke John of
Saxony will come out of the grave and be far more splendid
than the sun now is than that he is lying here before our eyes.
This is not so certain as the fact that he will live again and go
forth with Christ because God cannot lie. But take it to heart!
For he who does not have this comfort can neither comfort
himself nor be happy, but the more the Word escapes him the
more the consolation also escapes him. 47
Luther preached that the believer must cling to the Word of God and
Christ since belief was haunted by the possibility of unbelief. In his style and
the style of the faith he represented, he counseled, "If you give yourself to
Scripture, you will feel comfort and all your concerns will be better, which
otherwise you cannot control by any act or means of your own."48 The
assertion of trust in Christ was itself a kind of worship, a litany intended to
comfort. "This then is the true art, that in suffering and cross we should look
to the Word and the comforting assurance, and trust them, even as He said,
'In me you shall have peace, but in the world, tribulation' [cf. John 16:33] ."49
''To be sure, also the faithful are suffering tribulation, but they are consoled in
it, as we read in Ps. 4:2: 'Thou hast given me room when I was in distress,'
and in 2 Cor. 1:4: 'Who comforts us in all our tribulation.' This comfort hope
and trust in God have given us."so "Therefore when something terrifies or
harms you it is most comforting that you speak up, confess Christ, and say:
Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius, all things are under his feet, who can be against
me?"51
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Luther's homiletic foci were no different from other sermon writers in this
era: the cure of souls and orthodox teaching was the twofold emphasis. Not
only were parishioners repeatedly clued-up to the finer points of doctrinal
orthodoxy, but sermons also signified that the maintenance of theological
principles never had an intrinsic value. These homiletic samples, and many
more could be drawn from, also illustrate Luther's sense of Christian
obligation-responsibility. While the impact of preaching upon individual
hearers may appear negligible, sermons, with all their limitations, were the
best available device for forging corporate confessional identity, for creating
doctrinal uniformity, and building a more responsible character in God's
people. As we can see from this sample of Luther's sermons, he placed a high
value on his audiences' responsibility for their spiritual interests. The
prominent feature on which this selection of sermons focuses-just as in his
letters-is Luther's emphatic establishment of Jesus as the object and basis
of all consolation.
Him who comes to Me I shall equip, not only to be refreshed
and satisfied and to quench his own thirst but also to become
a sturdy, earthen vessel, endowed with the Holy Spirit and with
gifts that enable him to give consolation and strength to many
other people and to serve them, as he was served by Me.
Thus Christ proposes to transform the man who comes to
Him into a person different from the one Moses is able to
make of him.52

B. Letters and Occasional Writings
Just as in his sermons, Luther's correspondence provides continuous
opportunities to perfect his consolatory exaltation of God in life and death.
Luther's reputation for mordant and forceful language obscures his opposite
predilection for tender-hearted words of human sympathy and humor. His
letters to and about his children demonstrate this, especially those in reference
to the death of his children, where though grief-stricken he still praises God
and considers the feelings and concerns of others. On the one hand, because
of his own anguish, he is able to write powerful letters of consolation to
others. On the other, Dr. Mennecke-Haustein explains that his letters of
consolation have their basis in his own comfort and joy, in Luther's faithexperience that Christ is near to human beings and gives himself to them:
"This comforting and joy-inspiring ('trostliche und freudigmachende')
experience Luther sought to convey with his language making use of the
capacity of language to express emotion. "53
Either way, his pastoral reputation for assisting individuals became so
widespread that many wrote him asking him to send them in writing either
counsel or consolation if he was unable to come in person. 54 His epistolary
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practice has a paradoxical feel of an "absent presence" intrinsic to his direct
style. For example, with his removal of Friar Michael Dressel, the prior of the
Augustinian monastery at N eustadt/ Orla who was unable to maintain unity
and peace in the cloister, he states, ''And being absent, I want this letter to do
to you, who are not available to me now, [precisely] what I would have done
to you, could I be with you." He then consoles Dressel with the reminder
that leaders cannot be good and pious in and of themselves, they are responsible
to be peacemakers. 55
Note also the death of Benedict Pauli's only son. Luther advises mourning
but commands Pauli to "leave room for consolation. And this consolation is
that the Lord gave you and now has taken away your son.
Why do you
torment yourself so much about this? God is omnipotent. He who has
given you one son can also give you more." CitingJohn 14:19, Luther then
bumps up against theodicy and attempts to curb any notion that God is the
cause of evil, insisting that ''Why he pertnits this or that evil to befall us
should not trouble us at a1L,,56
And upon the death of Catherine Jonas, Luther writes to Justus Jonasthe surviving husband-a note of shared consolation. He mentions that his
own daughter (thirteen year old Magalena Luther, who had died just three
months earlier) "fell asleep on Jesus' bosom with so many godly and blessed
and this is my great and only consolation."57
expressions of faith in him
Another instance where Luther invokes the loss of his dearest, devoted
daughter was in his correspondence to Andrew Osiander who suffered a
double measure of grief with the loss of his wife and daughter.
But the language appears to shift ever so slightly in the letter to Osiander.
I find in it a bit of the language of an ethic of responsibility. The fact that
Osiander had "been visited by a cross and indeed a twofold cross" implies a
responsibility to bear it. And while God's evidential love toward Luther was
manifest in his dearest daughter, he is responsible to crucify his own
corresponding "natural love
which asserts itself too powerfully in us" in
order that "the good, acceptable, and perfect will of God may be done."58
Both Luther and Osiander are responsible to offer up their natural emotions
as if to replicate the Akedah Yitzchak (Gen. 22:2), "for the Lord this burnt
offering is necessary, for us it is a consolation."59 Thus, if Luther is espousing
a nascent ethic of responsibility, and I believe he is, then he is working with
the issues of integrating faith and ethics, or responsible living as an outworking
of his theology.
Besides the "crises" of death, other crises can strike the believer, be it
illness, [mancial woes, domestic difficulties, etc.; these too can result in: a crisis
of faith and were not uncommon runong Protestants. Salvation and its
assurance, peace and joy in one's life, as well as security in eternity, are issues on
which the conscience primarily suffers. These can serve as a sourcing mechanism
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for our investigatio n of the theme of consolation, Por Valentine Hausmann
and his chronic unbelief, Luther consoles him with the words, "How many
th ere are who have less faith than you have!" I-Iausemann's awareness of his
condition is an affirmation that God wants to help him, Luther seems to say
"hang in there!" "Cling calmly to God, and he will cause everything to turn
out welL"',(I Pour months later, Luther writes again insisting that Hausmann
should not be impatient with regard to achieving the strength of faith he
feels he ought: "Yo u should not worry too much about it," implores the
reformer. Furthermore, additional instructions and responsibilities are given
to assist in the situation:
You must pray powerfully, cry out against yo ur terror, and
repeat the Lord's Prayer in a loud voice, Above all, you must
take to heart that there is no doubt that your terror comes from
the devil. God wants you to resist, and it is on this acco unt that
he allows this to happen, And you may be sure that he will hear
lHJave something from the Psalms
fervent prayers and help,
or the New Testament read to you in a clear vo ice, and listen
attentively to the reading,'d
Examples of "other crises" include "Matthias Weller's and his bouts of
melancholy He was encouraged by Luther to avoid his own thoughts and to
listen to what others (presumab ly Christians) say to him, It is a di vine
command that they are to comfort one another, and he needs "to learn to
believe that God is speaking to you through them,",,2 His brother, J erome
Well er, lived in Luther's hom e, tutored the Luth<:f children, and served as
amanuensis for much of the tab le talk, For his depression Luther encourag<:d
him to "rejoice in this temptation of the devil because it is a certain sign that
God is propitious and merciful to you:' When the temptation to become
depressed appears, Jerome ough t not dwell 011 "those deadly thoughts," bu t
instead " joke and play games" in order to "drive out lthe] diabolical thoughts
and take courage:'G3 The stratagem for \'Veller was "more merriment!" and
forJona s Von Stockhausen, police captain of Nordhausen, the prescription
was "sweat it out!" "For the darts of the devil cannot be removed pleasantly
and without effort when they are so deeply imbedded in your fl es h, They
must be torn out by force:'64 Nonetheless, the foundational similarities
between these are Luth er's remind er of Christ's unpleasant sufferings and
believers' responsibility to bear them like him,
The preceding references can be re-read through the lenses of "personal
responsibility" as each case required an action or Luther prescribed a duty. In
his "1\ letter of consolation to the Christians at Haile"" \ (1527) occasioned by
the murder of his friend, follower, and young pastor- George Winklerand written to console hi s parishioners, the reformer's primary points include
a call for them to pray for their enemies, They are responsible not to retain any
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feelings of bitterness or thoughts of revenge, but to pity and pray for his
murderers. In the midst of this calling to act responsibly, he bids them to
accept suffering as natural and inevitable for Christians.
The fInal correspondence we will consider concerns George Spalatin who
wrote to Luther requesting that he prepare a book or letter of spiritual
consolation for Elector Fredrick who was bedridden with a serious illness.
Luther refused him, exclaiming to Spalatin-who was also the elector's chaplain
and secretary-that he did not see the necessity of it since he had already
written a modest exposition of spiritual comfort entitled Te.rsaradecas
consolatoria, "The Fourteen of Consolation."66 "Even better," responds Luther,
"why don't you urge him to read the Gospels and the Passion of Christ, for
there is no better consolation than that?"67
In sum, Marius relates "[t]here was always in Luther a powerful sense,
paradoxically terrifying and comforting at once, of the individual standing
alone before God."68 On the part of Luther's sermon hearers or recipients of
his letters, he consoled thcm with the good news ofjustifying grace. Theirs'
was a responsibility to labor hard through the suffering and grief, being
responsible before God and relying solely on Him for the results of His plan
as they had come clear in the death and resurrection of Christ as well as by the
means of grace in their own lives. As Dr. Jane Strohl of the Pacific Lutheran
Theological Seminary fIttingly contends, "Although he gives his own particular
cast to the art of dying, death remains the fInal test, and one is not wholly
secure until it has come and gone and found one steadfast. \~?hile proclaiming
faith to be a gift, Luther still holds the dying person responsib Ie for remaining
constant in the conviction that he is saved by grace alone."69
These representational selections of the Luther canon reveal his pastoral
concern and demonstrate his intentionality of calling people to live and die
responsibly in the context of the Word, to rely on the mercy of God and His
justifying grace, and to accept salvation and the consolation of God by faith.
The exempJarism contained in these sermons and correspondence was directed
primarily, although not exclusively, to sustaining a Christian attitude rather
than providing concrete examples of the Christian life and its good works.
The emphasis is not on an external act which is to be dutifully emulated, but
an internal mind-set which is to be evident to others. SpecifIcally, in their
responsibility to imitate the paradigmatic pattern of Christ's life, Christians
are to have faith in the midst of bearing the cross and faithfully serving the
needs of the neighbor, not as it is displayed in Jesus, but because it is displayed
in Jesus. Christians are to be obedient, humble and loving, not as Jesus
was-which would present an overwhelming challenge since we livc in vastly
different cultures and under immeasurably different circumstances-but
because he was.
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rv. Luther's Theology of Justification and Theological Ethics
The continuity between Luther and late medieval culture segues into a
new quality of the experience of God where God actively assails passive
humanity in order to bestow joy and courage to life. "This is the comfort that
preserves us. Our hearts are full of joy and courage despite the persecutions
and raging of the world. For we have the kind of Lord who does not merely
redeem us from sin, God's wrath, and eternal death, but who also protects
and saves us in suffering and persecution so that we do not perish."70 And
where the former response to human suffering, death, and the cure of souls
was culturally hidebound, Luther's response, and the content and shape of
his consolation-I am arguing-find its grounding in theological ethics and
its source in the doctrine of justification by grace through faith. Before we
investigate this, we are once again in a better position to understand Luther
and his theological ethics if we first understand his Sitz im Leben and the
contours of the theology and philosophical ethics to which he responds.

A. Justification By Grace Through Faith
In his lectures through the Psalms (1513-15), Romans (1515-16), and
Galatians (1519), and in his working out his theology in conttoversy with Eck
and his other detractors, Luther emphatically rejected the medieval notion of
progressive justification and its Aristotelian source that "we become just by
doing just acts.'>71 He came to see that the gospel reveals the righteousness of
God (iustitia Del) and that "by the righteousness of God we must not
understand the righteousness by which He is righteous in Himself but the
righteousness by which we are made righteous by God. This happens through
faith in the Gospel."72
In his sermon Two Kinds ojRighteousness (1519), Luther exclaims that it is
this righteousness, an "alien righteousness, that is the righteousness of
another, [which is] instilled [into us] from without. This is the righteousness
of Christ by which he justifies through faith."73 The justification of sinners
is not due to their sanctification, but due to Christ's fulfillment of all
righteousness. His righteousness has been imputed or credited to US. 74 Proper
righteousness is the outgrowth of Christ's alien righteousness (justitia Christi
aliena). It is proper "not because we alone work it, but because we work with
that first and alien righteousness. This is that manner of life spent profitably
in good works."75 The Reformation, like Paul, articulated the liberation of
humanity by faith from the obsession of works. Thus, the correct sequence
in Luther's mind was "Good works do not make a good man, but a good
man does good works."76 Along this line, Luther insisted that genuine faith
does not serve the self, but is active in love toward the neighbor. 77
Luther's juxtaposition of justification and consolation by faith is most
evident in his Lectures on Galatianswhere they appear as a sequential progression
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in the life of the believer that begins with justifying grace, gains momentum
by faith, and-like the concluding crescendo of a Bach fugue--ends with the
victorious climax of consolation. Justification-reception of forgiveness by
faith-gladdened and consoled conscience-triumph over troubles, including
the ultimate trouble, death. The doctrine of justification, for Luther, brings
assured "consolation to troubled consciences amid genuine terrors.»78 He
professed, "Thus when a man is consoled and encouraged by the grace of
God-that is, by the forgiveness of sins and the peace of conscience-he can
bravely endure and overcome all troubles, including even death itself."79 In
Luther's thinking, justification vouchsafes the experience of consolation.
Again, the reformer carries forward consolation as a conclusion to justification
when he insisted, "If He gave Himself into death for our sins, then
undoubtedly He is not a tormentor. He is not One who will cast down the
troubled, but One who will raise up the fallen and bring propitiation and
consolation to the terrified. Otherwise Paul would be lying when he says
'who gave Himself for our sins.m80 It is in Luther's theology of justification
we see what Christ's love has done for us, in the theme of consolation we see
theological ethics embodying justification, both of which are grounded upon
God's unmerited love for humankind.

B. Theological Ethics and the Ascription of Responsibili!J
Luther cut his ethical teeth, so to speak, while lecturing several times
weekly on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics during his first year at Wittenberg
(1508-09). Here he saw firsthand the amalgamation and domination of the
Aristotelian system in scholasticism. Aristotle's seminal doctrine of e~I~,
where humanity's moral virtue is incrementally realized, perfected, and made
permanent (on the order of skill or musical expertise achieved by continual
practice or. E:8IOl..loC;)81 was baptized by the scholastics who Christianized the
notion as an added sense to human nature, the vehicle by which good works
done in imitation of the example of Christ prepare for the reception of grace,
righteousness and, inevitably, salvation.
Against this thrust of most scholastic moral theory and anthropology
Luther asserted,
[t]he common saying that human nature in a general and
universal way knows and wills the good but errs and does not
will it in particular cases would be better stated if we were to say
that in particular cases human nature knows and wills what is
good but in general neither knows nor wills it.
And this is
in agreement with Scripture, which describes man as so turned
in on himself that he uses not only physical but even spiritual
goods for his own purposes and in all things seeks only himself.
This curvedness is now natural for us, a natural wickedness
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and a natural sinfulness. Thus man has no help from his natural
powers, but he needs the aid of some power outside of
himself. 82
It was the scholastics and their Aristotelian method of basing "sin and
righteousness on works, both their performance or omission,"83-the scope
of their actualization on what a person does-that troubled Luther. He
thought that this was to place action in ascendancy over being; and to be
turned into the self (incurvatus in se) instead of being absolutely dependent
upon God. Faith is not to look "within," but "outside of," to Christ. If we
believe that what a person is, is the result of what a person does, then the
matter of sin and grace are in point of fact removed from any discussion of
human nature; it consigns them solely to the realm of works. This, Luther
believed, is the underlying reason why,
[oJur theologians .. have deflected the discussion of sin to the
matter of good works only and have undertaken to teach only
those things by which works might be safeguarded but not
how through much agony men should humbly seek healing
grace and confess themselves to be sinners. Thus of necessity
they make men proud and cause them to think that they are
already entirely righteous when they have performed certain
outward works. 84
And this is why Luther reasoned that "[v]irtually the entire Ethics of Aristotle
is the worst enemy of grace. This in opposition to the scholastics.""'
Luther concluded that the Aristotelian person seeks his /her own good in
everything, and therefore human fulfillment comes in self-love. Furthermore,
inasmuch as the medieval ethic sought after justification and reduced to a
basic mechanistic imitation 86 ofJesus' life-style, both of which are primarily
ethical concepts, through pious works, the most we can say is that it was this
theological ethic which brought about the reformer's failure as a monk. 87 The
focal point of medieval Christology was the archetypal and paradigmatic
nature of the life, work and death of Christ, the Christus exemplum. 88 Luther
rejected medieval piety's placement of the Christus exemplum before the Chrisms
sacramentum, works before faith, and the imitatio Christi before conformitas
Christi. This is not to say that he rejected good works or the imitation of
Christ. In fact, it is faith in Christ's sacrifice which in turn obliges or "behooves"
us to imitate and live according to the example of Christ. 89 This reversal of
the traditional medieval order, rather than the compulsion of an existential
choice, is the truly revolutionary aspect of Luther's Christo logical and ethical
thought. It was the realization that in imitating Christ we cannot hope to
become a contributor to the divine activity of assimilating a copy of the
exemp!um. It is the reformer's theological ethics that make the believer
responsible to perform good works and it is her maintaining the imitation
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Christ that gives guidance and direction for those works to be performed.
Underlying this seemingly straightforward dichotomy is a profound
theological insight. The transformation of humanity is a prerequisite for its
reformation. The art of living authentically for God and for others, what we
may refer to as ars vivendi, is the spontaneous, responsibly responding action
of that transformed character participating in acts of beneficence as unto
God, not out of obedience to a discipline of law imposed from \\~thout. Yet here,
in a manner of speaking, is the proverbial rub in the reformer's theological ethics.
Luther first worked out some of the main contours of his theological
ethics in his 1520 tract, "The Freedom of a Christian."90 His undertaking was
to create a context in which people could become the kind of Christians
envisioned in this tract, introducing the seemingly complementary theses
that the Christian life was one wherein the Christian is "a perfectly free lord,
subject to none" and "a perfectly dutiful servant, subject to all."91 It makes
clear that a believing Christian is free from sin through faith in God, yet
bound by love to serve his neighbor, and Luther sees these as correlative
truths. Nonetheless, his ethics-based as it is on the law of love-contains
his famous ambivalence. On the one hand, it is free from the law; on the
other hand, deontologically, it really is G od's command, and the Christian is
responsible, even duty-bound to follow it. Is this not in fact a new formulation
of law standing in the way of true morality? How docs Luther advocate
freedom from law and resolve this apparent love legalism?92
Systems of ethics are inclined to discuss moral acts in terms of their goal
(teleological), duty (deontological), or fittingness (cathr;kontic). A theological
ethical system based upon the doctrine of justification by faith tends to
discuss moral acts in terms of what they presuppose or are intended to
express. From this standpoint, Luther asserted that the Christian is free
inasmuch as the Word of God and the forgiveness of sins in Christ liberates
her from sin, death, hell, and the devil. Such a liberated Christian does not
scorn good deeds but does them willingly. Joined with Christ in justification
the Chtistian lives as Christ in the world, a life of consoling service to others."
As to its outworking, Luther presented his theological ethics in the context
of his recommendations for practice. "\1(,'hy, the whole Scripture is concerned
with provoking us to faith; now driving us witll commands and threats, now
drawing us with promises and consolations. In fact, everything in Scripture is
either a command or a promise. The commands humble the proud with
their demands, the promises exalt the humble with their forgiveness."94 In
other words, the task of theological ethics is to present the claims of the
Word of God to humanity. Theological ethics must, therefore, remain
grounded in the Word of God; otherwise it is untrue to its charge and
disintegtates into a theoretical enterprise at best or-at worst-a metastatic
escapist gnosis. Luther elevated this new etllical context within the ilieologieal
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confines of his age anc..llived it out-lived it as a demonstration of consolation
and cura animamm-rct1ecting the Gospel working through the Christian
individual, penetrating whatever it touches as it serves others.
The fine, theological point ofit-a harmonizing ofms alleged ambivalence
seen through today's theological spectacles and wrapped in the parlance of
responsibility-is this: the task set before the Christian is more a responsibility,
and less a duty. It is discretionary, filled with problems left to one's moral
sensitivities and decision-making abilities. The norm is not simply a law to be
obeyed, but a job as a faithful, responsible steward to be done well (l\1t.
25:21). Just as the reformer responded in love to the real world of his
experience, the responsible Christian responds to God by responding in love
to the exigencies and people found in each situation with which experience is
shared.
The authentically Christian etmc for T,lither is based on an experience of
what God has given and makes possible, not on some absolutized perception
of what God demands; it therefore deals more with doerr than with specific
deeds (the parable of the Good Samaritan is really about being a neighbor,
not just loving one's neighbor). This is an ethics, then, that consists not of
Christian actions, but always of "Christian acting," not in the sense of roleplaying, but as a people who have been shaped by God whose Christian
responsiveness grows out of the response to God's love and responds to
othersYs Therefore, in the theological attribution of responsibility, the
Christian is made, not held, responsible. Casting this in terms of the reformer's
notion of conscience-the key to his mature theological understanding of
the sel( and a key insight into his theological ethics--our union with Christ96
makes us conscious of responsibility, th.e self as being before God and
responsible toward God.
V. Consolation and the Moral Economy of Christian Responsibility
In this article I have brought together Martin Luther's theology of
justification with his theol06'Y and ministry of consolation, and found them
to be compatible, based, as they are, on the love of God as revealed in Christ.
I have shown that the theme of consolation, while temporally conditioned,
affirmed, and established in the lives of people, is to be seen in the light of
Luther's theology of justification and theological ethics. Consolation was no
mere theoretical model; it was effectively used as a spiritual resource in his
personal experience.'" It was also understood to be biblically determined, as
Paul announced to the Corinthians (2 Cor. 1:3-7),

Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the
Father of mercies and the God of all consolation, who consoles
us in all our affliction, so that we may be able to console those
who are in any aft1iction with the consolation with which we
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ourselves are consoled by God. For just as the sufferings of
Christ are abundant for us, so also our consolation is abundant
thtough Christ. If we are being afflicted, it is for your consolation
and salvation; if we are being consoled, it is for your consolation,
which you experience when you patiently endure the same
sufferings that we are also suffering. Our hope for you is
unshaken; for we know that as you share in our sufferings, so
also you share in our consolation. 98
Accordingly, consolation begins with transcendence and turns to human
responsibility to fortify others, the same as loving one's neighbor. From its
place in the divine economy, consolation is to be injected by the Christian into
the lives of people when they need it most as part of the moral economy of
Christian responsibility.
We identify Luther as a reformer, yet his pastoral ministry was far more
extensive than is generally recognized. He never lost sight of the individual
soul, which he cared for and consoled with God's Word. And perhaps chief
among his contributions in the history of Christian thought was the notion
that the redeemed/justified do not need to be overwhelmed by sin, distress,
and death. Looking at the present-day religious scene, we may conclude that
he greatly contributed toward this, achievement. Not in the sense that psychotherapeutic religion has prevailed over cultural conceptions of death or in the
prolonging of biological survival over any cost in suffering, but in the
reformation sense; one that calls us, above all else, to protest our own sin and
insouciance toward God, to be open to God's love in life and death and to be
responsible to see the neighbor as Christ sees her, to be--in Luther's words"a Christ to the other."99
Against those who insist that "the stakes of evangelical spiritualism that
continue to be raised are at constant risk of having their bluff called,'>HlO or a
Nietzschean narcissistic assertive, "If it was the central purpose [of the
Protestant Reformation] to make people-all people-think, feel, and act as
Christians, to imbue them with a Christian mind-set, motivational drive,
and a way of life, it failed,"101 Luther would hurl his inkpot and offer his
Christological wager.
Why are you seeking and looking for other ways? Look to Me,
and reject all other thoughts regarding ways to heaven. You
must expunge these completely from your heart and think of
nothing but these words of Mine: "I am the Way." See to it
that you tread on Me, that is, cling to Me with strong faith and
with all confidence of the heart. I will be the Bridge to carry you
across. In one moment you will come out of death and the
fear of hell into yonder life. For it is I who paved the way and
the course. I walked and traversed it Myself, so that I might
take you and all My followers across. All that is necessary is that
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you unhesitatingly set yout foot on Me, wager boldly on Me,
go cheerfully and happily, and die in My name. 102
The imperatival tone in the reformer's wager tells us again that the
reformation ethic of responsibility is a theological ethic-more so, a Christian
ethic-insofar as it confesses Christ to be the participatory center of the
church and her ethics. Thus, it is Christological. In affirming this, we must
step back from our usual grounding of our ethics implicitly or explicitly in
various human experiences with respect to how we define morality. The
appeal to experience alone does not substantiate an ethical position. Nor can
the philosopher and theologian simply identify the state of affairs that must
obtain in human existence (i.e., the need of consolation) for persons to have
such experiences (i.e., being consoled). The ultimate and best evidence for
Christian ethics and justification lies in God's Word in its tripartite sense of
Christ, the gospel he made known, and the Scripture that reliably communicates
this and consolation to us (e.g., "Even though I walk through the valley of
the shadow of death," "God is our refuge and strength, a very present help
in trouble," "This is my comfort in my affliction, that your word has revived
me," "Come to me, all who are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you
rest.")
I have also demonstrated that a suitable context for consolation is the
moral economy of Christian responsibility. The responsibility to console
emerges from Christ's vicarious sacrifice into a world that is God's, yet fallen.
It is a mature ethic of care, of respect, and enhancement to the integrity of
life. The theme of consolation in Luther's correspondence and sermons not
only demonstrates but gives us the insight into his theological ethics that
there is a moral economy to Christian responsibility: Christians are to structure
the basic forms of human relationships in which they live in such a way that
God may be glorified and people might receive God's gift of consolation.
For Luther, the characteristic of this Christian life is life lived in response to
redemption. It is decisively rooted in one's responsibility to God for the
actions made in life, in one's faith, hope, and love. In so doing, the anxiety
and ritual of death are replaced by the ethics of life, through Jesus Christ;
through his life, death, resurrection, and reign in power. This was how Luther
reinterpreted his era's interpretations of life and death.
Indeed, the fundamental part of the Christian art of living (ars vivendi) is
the recognition that life takes place in the presence of God, and the challenge
to take responsibility for the whole of our lives, religious and secular, is as
stewards obedient to God. While we cannot simply repeat the reformer's
consolatory insights and inject them into out age, we can ask of what might
this ethics and ministry consist and where does it begin it in light of the
terrors of out day. The starting point of a genuinely Christian ethics in
Luther's system of thought and its relation to the realities of our world today

CUBILLOS:

CONSOLATIO~ AS THEME I~ LUTHER'S SERlV[ONS I 57

lies in the recognition that the conversion of the individual leads to a new
faith and obedience, a new lifestyle of being bound to the God who
commands, and a personal ethic of responsibility to the commands of God.
All too often Christianity today avoids responsibility when entering the realm
of love, and avoids love when entering the realm of responsibility. To the
extent that the people involved in the cure of souls are a Christ rooted people,
they must remember that the love and beneficent care offered to others is
implicit in their responsibly-responding relationship to God. As such, a
ministry of consolation may be the most effective way to promote a renewed
sense of Christian responsibility for today, because it emphasizes the inner
resources of faith and a redeemed life rather than any external incentives that
our world may offer.
What, then, does consolation in the moral economy of Christian
responsibility require? Tt is the responsibility for the Chris tian to be, on a oneto-one basis, a companion and encourager of him or her who is in distress,
in desperate need, or alone, to be spontaneously near him or her and absolutely,
genuinely present with someone whom hardship-of whatever nature it
may be-has placed in critical need or solitude. It includes loving our neighbors
(Rom. 13:8-10), caring for their souls, directing them to God, providing for
their needs where we are able, and speaking the consolations of God into
their life. ,o3 Barth concurs, "If another can comfort and encourage me by
telling me that he stands with me under the same command-and there is
no greater comfort or stronger encouragement on earth than awareness of
this common bond-nevertheless no other can be responsible for my proper
hearing of what is commanded of me. "'04
Thomas it Kempis wrote, ''All human comfort is vain and short."105 Not
so \vith the consolation of God; its forms are many and can always match the
suffering. God can deliver us "otttifaftliction" or encourage us "itt affliction"
so that it can be endured. Luther would be quick to add that the consolations
of God soften, rather than remove affliction. '06 The moral economy of
Christian responsibility today, just as in Luther's day, takes up this ministry
of care to temper sorrow, rather than striving to make it disappear, and what
is to be expected from its influence is calmness in catastrophe, strength in
tribulation, and peace in adversity rather than the sudden and definitive
extinction of all suffering. It is a positive ethics of accompaniment, as opposed
to living and dying in desolation.
At this point permit me to beg to differ with Pascalian heartfelt intuition
and the diminution of conso lation, that «Peu de chose nous console, parce
que peu de chose nous afflige.»107 Life-whether during the late 11iddle Ages,
or the Reformation, or today-involves a monumental amount of conflict
management, the greatest of which is death. A prevalent Christian theme
asserted by the reformer was that in order to achieve consolation in this life,
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one must first be responsible to confront and successfully manage the anxieties
of the age and the fear of death by responding and responsibly relying on the
God who alone redeems from sin, justifies, and gives peace of conscience,
comfort, and security. Thus, consolation is not a remedy, it is a result of the
remedy; it is found in ar.r 1)i1Je1Jdi not ar.r moriendi.

Robert H. Cubillos is visiting professor of current topics in Bible ami
theology at the Russian-American Christian University, Moscow, Russia, and
adjunct professor of philosophy at California State University, Dominguez
Hills, Carson California.
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92 Richard Niebuhr "solves" this problem in Luther by utilizing Ernst Cassirer's
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (4 vols.; trans. Ralph Manheim, pref. and
intro. Charles W. Hendl; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953-1996). He
relegates the law emphasis to the image of "man the citizen" homo politicus(the
obeyer and enactor of laws), which-incidentally-Niebuhr rejects, and
incorporates the love emphasis into the image of "man the answerer" homo
dialogicus (the fitting responder), the symbol of the responsible person. See H.
Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral
Philosophy(New York: Harper & Row, 1963). Gustafson "solves" it by considering
Luther's ethic a Gesinnungsethik, an ethic of disposition; as it is not a new external
law it avoids legalism. The Christian is inwardly disposed to do what the law
requires her to do in a different spirit from what was once the case and she acts out
her faith toward her neighbor in a spirit and manner that exceeds legal requirements.
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See James M. Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (New York: Harper & Row,
1968). The notion of exceeding legal requirements is reminiscent of two other
possible "solutions." Pascal's epigram indicated his contention that true morality is
found beyond the law, «Ia oraie morale Ie moque de la morall!» ("true morality laughs
at morality"), see Blaise Pascal, Oeuvres Completes (Texte Etabli et Annote par
Jacques Chevalier; vol. 34 Bibliotheque de la Pl6iade; Paris: Gallimard, 1954),
1094, §24. As well, Halakhic Judaism's concept of 1"il m,lZ77.1 O'l!l' (/ifnitll mishurat ha-din), usually rendered "beyond the line of the law" or "beyond the measure
of the law," understands morality to begin only after the fulfillment of the law. As
a supererogatory act, it promotes an end (teleologically) which is morally binding
to follow (deontologically), yet in such a manner that it is not deontologically
obligatory because it requires so much of the actor. The requirement is to do the
right and the good in the eyes of Yahweh (Deut. 6:18) as evolving from the
context of one's acts, and may vary with circumstances and individuals; different
from the imposition of a fIxed objective legal standard (1", din). Along this line,
George Lindbeck ("Martin Luther und der rabbinische Geist," Neue Zeitschrift
fur Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 40/1 [1998]: 40-65) fInds
formal similarities, despite material differences, in his comparison of Luther's
point of view as a pastor and catechist to Max Kadushin's probing of the Rabbinic
mindset in the latter's The Rabbinic Mind (Classics in Judaic Studies; New York:
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1952; repr., Binghamton, N.Y.: Global
Academic Publishing, 2001).
93 LW 21:103, Luther says, "Here you have a word and a command of God
hovering over you, commanding you to love your neighbor, to rebuke the disorderly,
and to comfort the sorrowful. Because it is a matter of command, it cannot be
wrong" (expo siting Mt. 5:33).

94

LW 36:124 (The Babylonian Captivity of the Church, 1520).

I am drawing on Niebuhr's The Responsible Self, 126, and his theological
conception of responsibility: "Responsibility affttms: 'God is acting in all actions
upon you. So respond to all actions upon you as to respond to his action.'"
95

96 A trenchant interpretation of neighbor love as shaped by justifIcation/
union with Christ which serves as a model to understand and integrate faith and
ethics-following the Finnish school of Luther interpretation-is provided by
Michigan State University College of I,aw Professor, Mark Totten, who also holds
a Ph.D. in ethics from the Yale University Department of Religious Studies. See
his "Luther on Unio cum Christo," Journal of Religious Ethics 31/3 (Winter
2003): 443-462.
97 LW 43:200, "I give thanks for his infInite compassion by which he has come
to me in such a fatherly way and, unasked, unbidden, and unmerited, has offered
to be my God, to care for me, and to be my comfort, guardian, help, and strength
in every time of need. We poor mortals have sought so many gods and would have
to seek them still if he did not enable us to hear him openly tell us in our own
language that he intends to be our God. How could we ever-in all eternitythank him enough!" (A Simple Way to Pray, 1535).

98 The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version (Nashville: Thomas Nelson
Publishers, 1989). Luther cites this passage in WA 15, (54) 69-78, LW 43:96-102
(A Christian Letter of Consolation to the People of Miltenberg Instructing Them
on the Basis of Psaim 120: How to Avenge Themselves on Their Enemies, 1524).
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LW 31:367 (The Freedom of a Christian, 1520).

Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (trans. David Wills; Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 111 culls this reading from Charles Baudelaire,
"The Pagan School," in Lois Boe Hyslop and Prancis E. Hyslop,.Jr., eds and trans.,
Baudelaire as Literary Critic (Universiry Park: Pennsylvania State Dniversity Press,
1964), 74-77 Derrida argues that the act of doing good is a gift to someone that
usually comes at a greal cost to us, the greatest of which would be to die for
others. Derrida's clever yet slight reference to the Christian teaching of God
suffering a death to save humanity (p. 40-50) is eclipsed by his discussion of .Jan
Patoeka's distillation of religion as responsibility and Nietzsche's Genealogy of
Morals as "the long history of the origin of responsibiliry (Verantwortlicbkeif)" (p.
112). \Vhilc religion needs to sustain its conversation with its secular critics, and
vice versa, identifying the essence of religion to be responsibility results from
drawing a sizeable portion of religious dross from their theological predecessors.
100

101 Gerald Strauss, Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the Young
in the German Reformation (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1978),307, in Hendrix, Recultivating the Vineyard, 149 This sentiment,
particularly indicative of the reductionistic element in Strauss' work, also reflects
a morally solipsistic thought on Christianiry in general. It calls to mind Nietzsche's
madman who announces the death of Godin The Gay Science, no. 125 (1882) and
his haunting queries, '''Whither is God?' he cried. 'I shall tell you. We have killed
him - YOLi and I. All of us are his murderers
How shall we, the murderers of all
murderers, comfort ourselves?'" Nietzsche devoted the lingering years of his rational
life to the answer that humanity must take the matters of forgiveness and atonement
into its own hands. So too with our consolation, at the end of the day it can be
found by our own hand, "The thought of suicide is a strong means of comfort: it
helps us get through many an evil night." Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and
Evil (ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann; trans. Judith Norman; Cambridge Texts in the
History of Philosophy; Cambridge, UK.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 70,
§157
102

LW 24:42 (comments on John 14:7).

Mennecke-Hauslein, Luthers Trostbriefe, 274, emphasizes this aspect of
Luther's consolatory style, "Viclmehr betont er immer wieder seinen Willen, sich
urn den Cons oland us Zu bemtihen, sein Bestes :tu geben und alle seine Kiinste
sprachlichen Oberredens und Oberzeugens, des Aufmunterns und Erheiterns, kurz,
seine rhetorica consolatrix einzusetzen" ("Rather he stresses repeatedly that it is
his will to exert himself for the one being consoled, to give his best and to use all
his speaking skills in persuading and consoling, in encouraging and cheering up, in
short, his rhetoric of consolation").
103

104 Karl Barth, Ethics (trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley; l\;ew York: The Seabury
Press, 1981), 84.
105 Thomas it Kempis, The Imitation of Christ: A New Reading of the 1441
Latin Autograph Manuscript by William C. Creasy Uvlacon, Georgia: Mercer
University Press, 1989), 73.
106

LW 33:137 (explicating Ezek. 18:23, 32 in The Bondage of the Will,

1525).
10, Pascal, OeLlvres Completes, 1132, §175, "little things console us, because
little things afflict us."
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CREIGHTON MARLOWE

The Wicked Wealtf?y

in

Isazah 53:9

The meaning and pointing of'" ti)l7 in Isa 53:9 (usually rendered "rich")
remain controversial subjects and need resolution because of the importance
of this verse and chapter in the history of Old Testament (OT) messianic
interpretation.' One approach has been to emend it to "evil-doers"
(l7, "tDl7).2 Others leave the text as it stands in the MT, believing the text
anticipates or predicts the burial of Jesus in the tomb of the rich Joseph of
Arimathea. 3 The fact that "rich" is a tri-consonantal reversal of its parallel
term "wicked" (1" ti)l7 110" l7ti),) has been noticed by a few commentators.
But since "rich" is not a normal parallel for "wicked," they conclude
emendation is the best solution. Most, however, do not mention this
literary feature or see it as exegetically significant.
This article will argue that emendation is not required because "rich" can
provide a proper synonymous and semantic parallel to "wicked" in this text
and within its OT context. 4 These "rich" are the "wicked rich." While
rejecting the MT reading as the Hebrew word for "rich," some in principle
have agreed by proposing a sense like "rabble" based on an Arabic cognate.
What follows will establish that Isa 53:9 is not a prophecy applicable to the
wealthy Joseph in whose tomb Jesus was buried. A contribution to scholarly
debate on this matter is made, not by discovery of the interplay of common
letters for "wicked" and "rich," but by demonstrating that this play on words
is an intentional use of the word "rich" because it offers this pun and provides
a suitable synonymous parallel to the "wicked ones" of the preceding poetic
line. These "rich ones" in the OT cultural climate also would have been
considered disreputable people. This study hopes to answer the challenge
posed by Watts in his commentary on Isaiah: "With a rich one remains
unexplained. The phrase has been applied to Jesus
but it is difficult to
find the meaning in its original setting."s Further it will challenge the answer
given by Young's commentary: "There is no need to assume that '''ti)l7
necessarily connotes rich men who are evil."6 Isaiah 53:9a (the first of two bicola in v. 9) will be shown to be a synonymous and symmetric parallelism:
a-b-c / / [a']-b' -c' with a 3:2 word-count meter. The translation of this text
that will be defended is:
68
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A
And-it-was-assigned

B
with-the-wicked

[A']

B'

[And-it-was-allocated]

with-the-wealthy [oppressors]

C
his-grave

I 69

//

C'
his-death.

Survey of Modern Interpretations/Translations of Isaiah 53:9a
The issues that divide interpreters and translators ofIsaiah 53:9a are evident
when versions and commentaries are compared. Many leave interpretation
open to the reader while others are minimally or highly interpretive, but rarely
is l' V!) rendered other than "rich."7 Others also have accepted that "[the]
rich [ones]" is a repetition of" [the] wicked ones" in Isa 53:9a. While concluding
that "'rich' is not a natural [parallel] to 'wicked'," North makes reference to
Nyberg's work in 1942 which insists that these terms are synonymous and
uses the OT prophets' denunciations of the rich as proof. 8 What follows will
pick up where Nyberg left off and provide similar and additional, yet hopefully
more convincing, support for the synonymous parallel of "rich" and ''wicked''
in Isa 53:9a. What is new is the conviction that the author purposefully
employed l' V!) to symbolize the "wicked" (!)V1), using this reversal of
letters as a literary device to enable his readers to make the interchangeable
connection between the wicked and the "wicked wealthy." Childs rejects this
approach by saying that a link between the burial of the rich and wicked
"hardly offers a natural parallel within Israel."9 This is true in terms of the
burial customs for each class of citizens, but the concern of the text ofIsaiah
53:9 is with the fact that the Servant undeservedly was treated like a criminal
(which concept is identified as those who are "wicked" / / "rich',). Even
Childs helps on this point by noting that this juxtaposition (wicked / / rich)
continues the typology of the Servant as the righteous and innocent sufferer
of the Psalter.!O Others, in line with Nyberg, as Childs points out, allow for
"rich" to have, within its semantic range, the sense "rich through extortion."!!

Exegesis of "Rich" in Isaiah 53:9a
The main controversy that surrounds Isa 53:9ai (11:Jp t1' !)tD"n..,~ r1',)
is the meaning of the opening verb based on the root1r1j ("give"; "place").
Regardless of how this is resolved, it has little or no bearing on whether
1'V!) in 9aii means "a rich one" or "the rich ([oppressive] ones)."!2
The phrase "r1~:J 1'[I!)-r1~' (53:9aii) is the great challenge for the
exegete of this verse. Who is this rich one or rich ones? Why the plural
expression "in his deaths"? Is the initial wawantithetical? Since the verse
begins with a wcaryiqto! (preterite, past-tense) verb, and not a W-qata! (so-called
prophetic perfect), why do some say this text prophesies the death and/or
burial of this servant with a rich man?13 Is he Israel or an individual? Was he
associated in death with the wealthy and wicked (synthetic parallel) or just the
wicked (synonymous parallel) or, contrary to expectation, with the rich
(antithetic parallelism)? Our concern is with the meaning of this clause in its
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immediate literary, linguistic, and living contexts. Notably the NT does not
use this text (Isa 53:9a) as one fulfilled by Jesus. 14 The term l' tbll ( ("rich")
is singular; but is it a collective (plural) or numerical (singular) single form in
function?15 The LXX uses plural forms for both "wicked" and "wealthy."
The poetics ofIsaiah 53:9a are arguably those of a synonymous parallelism.
The verb of 53:9ai must be supplied for 53:9aii and the final terms mirror
each other ("his grave" and "in his deaths," which latter is often emended to
"in his tomb"). All this warrants that the remaining and medial terms
(adjectives) of 53:9ai and aii be viewed as mirror images. 16 Since "[the] wicked
[ones]" is plural "rich" can be interpreted as a collective singular, i.e. "[the]
rich [ones]." Futther, since the context is about the intentional andlor actual
mistreatment of a righteous one as if unrighteous, the mention of the
"shearers" in 53:7 shows that the author is focused on the oppressors (cf. vv.
7a and Sa) of this "lamb" (cf. vv. 6-7). Such undeserved association with evil
oppressors is the concern ofIsaiah 53:9. As a result the initial waw of 53:9aii
may be taken as pleonastic (stylistic and un-translated) or explicative ("even")
rather than adversative ("but"; e.g., N ASB uses "yet").

The Poetry and Poetics of Isaiah 53:9a
The Hebrew consonantal text of Isaiah 53:9a may be schematized as
follows (d. the MT major disjunctive accents):
~

~

~

i'r11,j:l1'rD!n'~1 [1r1'] (9aii)

c

I I 11:lp

b

a

tl'llrD1-r1~ 1r1'1 (9ai)

It forms one line of a synonymous, incomplete bi-colon with a 3:2
word-stress meter. 17 As the mechanical layout of 53:9a above shows, 9aii
is a mirror image of 9ai. Most telling is the fact that the words for
"wicked" and "rich" share the same basic consonants but in reverse order,
producing a kind of alliteration and assonance: +.i) / / tl+' +ll+tv+ 1
1+' + tv (reM 'fm II 'asfr). This has been recognized previously by scholars. IS But
the main contention here is that this phonetic and morphological similarity
was a pun intended to clarify that these "rich ones" are related to the "wicked
ones." These are the wicked rich or wealthy oppressors. For those who
interpret this oppressed servant messianically and individually, he would be
treated like a criminal in his death and burial. He would be "assigned" by evil
design a place with the dregs of society although he did not deserve it. This
was the intention of the oppressors, regardless of what kind of tomb he
actually received. Por those who interpret this suffering servant as Israel
(typologically messianic to some), the nation was unjustly treated as one
deserving a dishonorable death or burial. This suffering servant, though not
guilty of violence or verbal abuse (v. 9b, or if synonymous, only verbal
violence), has a criminal's tribute and tomb planned for him. This proposed
synonymy of "wicked" and "wealthy oppressors" is further strengthened by
the fact that other approaches to explain contextually this term (1'tbll) are:
(1) to emend to.i)1 ' tvll "doers of evil"; or (2) to defer to an Arabic cognate
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(thus Hebrew homograph) meaning "refuse [noun]" or "rabble"; or (3) to
emend to "demons" (tl'1,VttJ)Y It should be noted that no textual data
exist to support these or any other proposed emendations. We are left,
therefore, to do the best we can exegetically with the text as it stands.
A major exegetical issue for many commentators is the plural form of the
fInal term of 9aii "in his deaths" (l'r1tlJ).20 The point of the various
proposals is that this may have referred to a burial place or tomb built at a
religious site. 21 An argument that tries to support the plural Mf form "deaths"
as original says that it refers to the nation ofIsrael rather than an individual,
or it is a plural collective to parallel the singular collective in the synonymous
colon. 22 "Tomb" is a more exact parallel with "grave" but "death" does not
remove the synonymous nature of these two cola in Isaiah 53:9a. Whatever
the conclusion ("death" or "tomb',), the evidence for the meaning of "rich"
(1' ttl,V) presented so far is not affected one way or the other.
Some suggest that the interpretation of the preposition (~,V) that begins
the bi-colon immediately following (Isa 53:9b) does tip the scales one way or
the other as regards the subject ofIsaiah 53:9a. Oswalt, for example, notes
that antithetical parallelism (thus adversative waw) for Isa 53:9a could be
supported bya causal use of''v in 53:9b; that is, that the original plans were
thwarted due to the servant's righteousness. 23 But since synonymous
parallelism is so likely in 53:9a, the preposition beginning the bi-colon of
53:9b must be taken as concessive "although," which is a rare but possible
use of ~,V 24 However, regardless of whether one says "because he did no
violence" or "although he did no violence," the arguments for the
synonymous nature of Isaiah 53:9a stand.
The Wicked and Wealthy in the OT
The author of Isaiah 53 could expect his audience to relate to his parallel
of "rich" and ''wicked'' and play on the shared root consonants because in
their world of religious thought the "rich" were often considered disreputable.
A number of OT passages support this,2s as well as the collective use of
singulars like "rich."26 In the Book ofIsaiah l' ttl,V is a hapax legomenon. 27 It
is found twenty-two other times in the OT. 28 Little is said of riches in Isaiah,
when other words rendered "rich" are investigated. Mainly, riches are the
spoils of the nations and salvation that God's people will receive
eschatologically (Isa 25:6; 30:23; 33:6; 45:3; 60:5, 11; 61:6; 66:12). InIsa 10:3
wealth is left behind when disaster strikes. North notes that Nyberg insists
the words "rich" and "wicked" in Isa 53:9a are synonymous and quotes the
prophets' denunciations of the wealthy. In addition he quotes a Targum as
identifying these "rich" as "rich in possessions they have obtained by
violence."29 The translation "a rich man" is viewed as pedantic since the
singular Hebrew form (1'ttl,V) is a collective (plural) in function. 3o
Synonymous Parallelism ofIsaiah 53:9b
The bi-colon in 53:9b does not have to be synonymous in order for the
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one in 53:9a to be synonymous, but then the likelihood that 53:9a is
synonymous is strengthened. Most have taken 53:9b as synthetic but an
argument can and will be made that it is synonymous. The following will
show that this second bi-colon of 53:9 is synonymous: he did no violence
[with his mouth]!! that is, no deceit [was] in his speech.
The structure and poetry of this verse is suggestive of its synonymy:

[D]

B
no-wrong
tl~n-~~

A
Although

[he-did]

B'2B'!
and-no deceit

[A]
[Although]

[i1to.lJ]

i1rJ'~

['.lJj

[with his mouth]

C
he-did

Q'!J:J]

iitO.lJ

D
with-his-mouth

, '!J:J

[C]

~"

'.lJ

This results in a line of synonymous bi-colon, with the pattern a-b-c-[d]!!
[aJ-b 1-b 2 - [c]-d, and a 3:3 word-stress meter. The wawbeginning the second
half of this parallelism is to be understood not as co-ordinative ("also") but
as pleonastic (stylistic) or explicative ("even") or emphatic ("especially").31
Reverse parallelism is perhaps less rare than often imagined. 32 The second
member of the parallelism may contribute to the fIrst, whereas most often it
happens the other way around. Not only poetically is synonymy supported
but also lexically and contextually. The word often rendered "violence" (tIrJn)
can just mean "wrong [especially 'as a false witnessl" 33 In context 53:9b is
a flashback to v. 7, where the servant's mouth is first mentioned for its virtue:
"He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he did not open his mouth; like
a lamb that is led to slaughter, and like a sheep that before its shearers is
silent, so he did not open his mouth" (NRSV). The emphasis in context is
on the lack of speech-related sins. He refused to be abusively defensive or to
lash out verbally in revenge or anger at those who abused him. Isaiah 53:9b,
then, may be read not as the servant's avoidance of physical and verbal
retaliation but as only the latter, restated as reverse parallelism. The "violence"
of Isa 53:9bi is the verbal violence of a false or hostile witness. 34 A key OT
theme is the importance of knowing how and when to speak. OT wisdom
literature abounds in advice about speaking seldom, sensibly, and sanely.3S
The Apostle Peter (1 Pet 2:21-24) may have reflected upon this OT spirituality
in the light of Jesus' teachings,36 when he recalled the words ofIsa 53:9b to
illustrate the sinless life of Christ, who stood silent before his accusers and
went willingly and quietly to his undeserved crucifIxion.
New Testament Use of Isaiah 53:9b
The NT does make messianic use ofIsa 53:9b (1 Pet 2:22) while it nowhere
employs 53:9a. Such an argument from silence does not prove the
interpretation of "rich" as "[wicked] rich" as opposed to "rich [man]," but
why the Apostles would have by-passed such a precise proof-text if they saw
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a parallel between it and the rich Joseph of Arimathea is very curious. Peter,
apparently, was more impressed with the typology of the parallel between the
Isa 53 servant's silence than his burial, for whatever reasons. The interpretation
being proposed merely clarifies that 53:9aii is a restatement of what is said
about him in 53:ai (that he was treated like a criminal at the time of his death).
Isaiah 53:9b adds that he was not deserving of such abuse; although (or
"because") he had committed no violence or spoken deceitfully (as most
versions have it). But as shown above this second bi-colon of 53:9 is likely
synonymous, as is the previous one.
Immediately before Peter cites Isa 53:9b, he says that the way Jesus suffered
is an example to believers (2:21), and immediately following he explains how
this example is primarily in how he managed his mouth (2:23). Part of
l\1atthew's account of Jesus' trial explains that he gave no answer to his
accusers and refused to reply to a single charge from Pilate, to his amazement
(lvIatt 27:12-14). Peter does not introduce this quotation \vith a formula of
fulfillment or of it being a pronouncement of Scripture, and makes no
reference to the OT author or book. He does employ it contextually, however,
in a manner that indicates he understood Isa 53:% (and presumably 9a et al.)
as suitable for application to Jesus. But Peter's version of Isa 53:9b is more
reflective of the Greek than Hebrew OT. Instead of "he did no violence [or
'devised no scheme'] " of the MT, 1 Peter 2:22 has "who committed no sin"
(cf. LXX "because he practiced no lawlessness").3 7 Apparently Peter wanted
to emphasize that the Messiah Oesus) was sinless not just innocent of
particular types of wrongdoing or harm (physical or verbal). While the LXX
uses "because," Peter chooses to focus on this sinless character, and is not
concerned with the connection to 53:9a.
Conclusion
Challenging the consensus of opinion that "rich" (1'ib.!)) in Isa 53:9aii is
either synthetically or antithetically related to "wicked ones" (0' .!)ib1) in
53:9ai, this examination ofIsa 53:9 has determined that the relationship is
most likely synonymous, and that the best translation of1' iLl.!) is as a collective
singular adjective functioning as a plural indirect object (the same as "wicked
ones" in the previous colon): "rich [ones]." Further the common association
of wealth and wickedness in the OT world suggests that within this
synonymous parallelism, the full sense is "[the] wealthy [wicked]." The
author's intention in v. 9 was to tell about the servant's undeserved suffering
(v. 9b), wherein he was portrayed and processed as a criminal in his death and
burial by his persecutors and prosecutors (v. 9a). The plan of these evil
people (rich and reprobate) was to place him among the refuse of mankind
(v. 9a), even though he had committed no violent and verbal crimes (v.9b).
The synonymy of "wicked" and "wealthy" is strengthened by the fact that
these two Hebrew words share the same basic consonants, but in reverse
order. The author intended his readers to take this as a sign that "wicked" of
tlle preceding parallel line is interhvined wid. fue "wealthy" of v. 9aii. Therefore
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emendation ofl'ibll to "doers of evil" (1'1 't:Jll) as often resorted to, in
spite of no textual ev.idence, is unnecessary. The content, construction, and
context of lsa 53:9 argue for a synonymous parallelism not only in v: 9a but
also in 9b. This depends on accepting the presence of reverse parallelism in
both cases in addition to observing how other structures and statements in
the immediate and more distant contexts support the synonymous nature
of these two bi-cola. Consequently the proposal being made is that "violent"
of v. 9bi be understood as a counterpart to "no deceit was in his mouth" of
v. 9bii. The synonymy of Isa 53:9a is not dependent on this but is
strengthened by it. It was demonstrated that OT thought is replete with
concepts about the frequent wickedness that comes from wealthy and powerful
people, the servant's (or for some the Messiah's) verbal virtue, and the
righteousness of speaking the right words at the right time. Silence or
economy of words is highly praised. The S/servant especially is praised for
being quiet before his enemies and not sinning verbally. A case has been
made for the understanding ofIsaiah 53:9 as a text that reveals that (1) the
suffering servant would be handled by his opponents as a criminal in regard
to his death and burial (53:9a); and (2) this treatment would be unfair and
unjust because this servant had never sinned verbally or had never acted
violently or retaliated verbally (53:9b).

W Creighton Marlowe is associate professor of Old Testament at
Evangelische Theologische Faculteit in Leuven, Belgium.
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EndNotes
1 TDOT recognizes lhis verse as "the most disputed text" (as regards this term
in the OT) which many and especially older scholars consider corrupt. G. Johannes
Botterweck , Helmer Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry, eds., The Theological
Dictionary of the Old Testament [TDOTJ, vol. XI: 419 (Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001), S.v. iibtl by S""b0.

2 Cf. I .udwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner, eds., Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti
Libras (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), S.v. i'iblJ ; Joseph Blenkinsopp, IJaiah 40-55,
The Anchor Bible, vol. 19A (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 348; Christopher R.
North, The Second I.raiah (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964), 231; A. Schoors,
Jesaja II. De Boeken van het Oude Testament Dee! IXB (Roermond: J. J. Roman &
Zonen, Uitgcvcrs, 1973), 326; C. C. Torrey, The Second iJaiah: A Nov Interpretation
(Edinburgh: T. & '1: Clark, 1928), 420; and Claus Westermann, Das Buch Jesaja 40-
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66 (Gattingen: Bandenhoed & Ruprecht, 1966), 205, n. 6; and F. Delitzsch,
Isaiah, trans!. James Martin, 2 vols. in one (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1973 rpt. ed.), II: 327
3 Cf., as representative of much Evangelical popular scholarship, the Moocfy
Monthly article by Allan A. Macrae, which argues that the waw connecting each
parallel line must be adversative ("but") and that the singular "rich" must mean "a
rich man." See Allan A. Macrae, ''With the Rich in His Death," Moocfy Monthly
(September 1976): 70. For a defence of the messianic prophecy position cf. E. J.
Young, The Book of Isaiah, vol. 3: chapters XL-LXVI, The New International
Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1972),
353, n. 34.
4 In this article parallelism of the verses concerned will be described in
traditional terms as synonymous, synthetic, or antithetic for convenience sake.
While the author is very aware of the modern trends and theories regarding the
nature of parallelism, these do not prove that the categories of synonymy or
antithesis are not valid in many cases. "Synthetic" masks the great variety and
complexity and mystery ofbi-cola that are not strictly synonymous or antithetical,
but time and space do not allow me to discuss these matters here. Suffice it to say
that the following essay is an argument for the recognition of synonymy in these
verses, regardless of the fact that many OT poetic passages or verses are monocola,
tricola, or simple statements of ''A, also B." I t is well recognized that the OT poets
could work apart from parallelism when desired or required; and that debate
continues over the precise nature of meter and parallel thought, as well as the
concept and character of Hebrew poetry. See e.g. publications by (see Selected
Bibliography) A. Berlin, James Kugel, R. Alter, J. P. Fokkelman, A. Schakel, A.
Cooper, M. O'Connor, F Landy, W. Watson, and D. Clines, inter alia.

5 John D. W. Watts, Isaiah 34-66. Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, TX: Word
Books, 1987), 231.
6 Young, 353, n. 34.
7 Among morc recent and popular English versions, the NIV has "He was
assigned a grave with the wicked [plural], and with the rich [singular] in his death"
while NRSV has "tomb" instead of "death." If this is a synonymous bi-colon then
the singular "rich" would have to be taken as a collective singular (singular in form
but plural in function). NASB interprets the text as an intentional messianic
prediction: "His grave was assigned with wieked men, Yet He was with a rich man
in His death." But Blenkinsopp translates: "His grave was located with the wicked,
his sepulcher with reprobates." Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40-55,345. Along similar lines
North offered: ''And they gave him burial among felons, And with the dregs of
men when he died." North, The Second Isaiah, 65. To move away from just English
texts, and more traditional by contrast, Baltzer has "Und Er gab ihm bei Verbrechern
sein Grab und bei einem Reichen seine Stiitte." Klaus Baltzer, Deutero-Jesaja
(Giitersloh, GR: Giitersloher Verlagshaus, 1999), 494. Luther's text reads: "Und
man gab ihm sein Grab bei Gottlosen und bei Ubeltiitern, als er gestorben war."
Die Heilige Schrift (philadelphia: The National Bible Press, 1967), 669.
B North, The Second Isaiah, 231; citing H. S. Nyberg, "Smartornas man. En
studie till Jes. 52, 13-53, 12," Svensk Exegetisk Arsbok 7 (1942), 5-82.
9 Brevard S. Childs,
Isaiah, The Old Testament Library (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 417
10 Ibid.
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Ibid. But no footnote is offered to tell who these are.
KJV has the strange but literal "he made his grave," which represents the
kind of translation that lead to the desire for emendation. Cf. Baltzer, DeuteroJesaja,494. Childs, Isaiah, 408; C. C. Torrey, The Second Isaiah: A New Interpretation
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1928), 253; North, The Second Isaiah, 65; Christopher R.
North, The Suffiring Servant in Deutero-Isaiah, 2nded. (Oxford:University Press,
1956), 122; Claus Westermann, Das Buch Jesaja 40-66 (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1966), 205; Schoots, Jesaja II, 326; Koehler and Baumgartner, eds.,
Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros, s.v. r1J. The verb as it stands has an indefinite
subject, which apparently led Torrey to translate it "appoint." See Torrey, 253,
420. Exegetes face the urge to re-point the verb as passive ("he/it was assigned")
or use a third plural subject ("they appointed',). Change lr1O'l wqyyittr;n either to
It'J?l wqyyuttan or jjt;l'l wqyyitfniJ. This latter option follows IQIsa'
Cf.
Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40-55, The Anchor Bible, vol. 19A (New York:
Doubleday, 2002), 348. Blenkinsopp renders it "located." Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 4055, 345. The LXX, interestingly, has the equivalent word but uses a future tense
and 1"-person pronoun ("and I will give"), whereas the Mr is unmistakably past
tense and 3'd_person. Similarly the Vulgate employs the future tense but stays with
the 3nl-person subject ("and he shall give''). Sapp has suggested that the consonantal
text ofMr or Qumran represents a present tense imperfect 0r1" wytn "he gives"
or ,jr1', wytnw "they give''). Sapp takes the Qumran text as a corrective on the
Mr. DavidA. Sapp, "The LXX, lQIsa, and MrVersions of Isaiah 53," inJesusand
the Suffiring Servant, ed. William H. Bellinger,Jr. and William R. Farmer (Harrisburg,
PA: Trinity Press International, 1998), 190. With simple waw these could be
interpreted, alternatively, as future tense, since the morphology would be the
same--context making the difference. Some argue for an active form with passive
function. E.g. Macrae alludes to examples in Gen 11:9; 48:1; Am 6:12; and Mic
2:4. See Macrae, "With the Rich in His Death," 70. But none of these examples
uses lr1l
13 Of interest is the fact that only Matthew finds it necessary to speak of
Joseph's wealth (cf. Matt 27:57-61; Mark 15:42-47; Luke 23:50-56; and John
19:38-42).
14 However, Peter does utilize Isaiah 53:9b (the second of the two bi-cola in v.
9; cf. 1 Pet 2:22), which suggests a mindset among the Apostles that the entire
verse and perhaps chapter are Christological, at least by application. Peter calls
Christian slaves to follow Christ's example of not retaliating against those who
ruistreat them but rather fully trust in God (cf. 1 Pet 2:18-24). Isaiah 53:9b is
quoted as a proof-text that Christ did not retaliate verbally when insulted on the
Cross, what Peter calls "the tree"(1 Pet 2:21-24). The text, if messianic, onlyforeshadows or foretells that the S/ servant will be treated in purpose, if not in
practice, as a criminal when dead and buried, although he comruitted no crime.
15 This is handled in one of two ways by the versions. NRSV, KjV, NKJV, NIV,
and JB (to name a few) all read "with the rich"; while the ASV and NASB, for
example, have "with a rich man." The former versions take this word as a collective
singular while the latter ones as a numerical singular. LXX and Vulgate have "and
the rich" (respectively, Kat TOV~ TIAovaiov~ and et divitem) as well as Syriac
('tyri and Targum ('1.0'rI.!,) 'attfre). Macrae's argument (''With the Rich in His
Death," 70-71) that something must be added after "rich" is insightful, but this
does not mean that "man" must be added. It is just as reasonable to add "ones." His
point that languages like German and Hebrew often use a singular adjective like
11
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rich to nlcan "rich nlan" applies equally to "rich l11el1." The definite use of anarthrous

nouns in Greek or Hebrew is well documented. In OT poetry many nouns are
definite without the definite article prefixed. Nothing in the Hebrew language
indicates clearly that an anarthrous noun (as "wicked ones" in Isa 53:9ai) applies to
a small number of people while if definite it wuuld mean "a large group." The
surrounding context defines this wicked group as more than a few.
16 Cf. John )J. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66, NICOT, cd. R. K.
Harrison and R. L. Hubbard, Jr. (G rand Rapids: Wm. H. herdmans Publishing Co.,
1998), 397 Oswalt urges that the text must not be made to say more than it does
by forcing an antithetical parallelism onto a text that structurally is clearly
synonymous. Delitzsch (rraiah, II: 326-29) argues in much linguistic detail for the
traditional "rich," also compelled by the presupposition of Jesus' fulfillment of
the verse. Disagreement with Dc1itzsch is not on a linguistic and lexical basis but
a poetical and hermeneutical one. He is bothered by Luther's marginal gloss "a rich
man who sets all his heart upon riches, i.e. a wicked man" (p. 327), the very view
this article supports. Delitzsch wrote when conservative scholars had fewer
hermeneutical options than today, especially with our expanded understanding of
how the NT uses the OT in light of tirst-century Jewish exegesis. But as will be
sho\vn, the understanding of "rich"as synonymous v. rith '"'v.~ickcd" does not remove
a valid messianic application to Jesus, it just restricts the fulfillment to his being
treated like a criminal rather than that plus being buried in a rich man's tomb. The
translation of i'iblJ in lsa 53:9aii is properly "rich" as Delitzsch and others
demonstrate. Its interpretation or application in the context of Isa 53, the poetry
of v. 9, and biblical prophecy is that of "[the wicked] wealthy." "Rich" here
parallels "wicked ones" so is a figurative way to restate the latter (which is the first
group named in Tsa 53:9ai, followed by its counterpart "rich lones]" in 53:9aii).
Word meanings (usages) are principally governed by context and in poetry to
parallelism. Authors arc not restricted to common lexical options especially when
writing poetically.
17 The word order (explicit or implicit) for each member of the parallel line is
verb + indirect, adjectival object + direct object (V IS + TO + DO). Poetic
analysis of OT Hebrew continues to be controversial and subject to various
systems and nomenciature. Whatever scheme or terminology is employed, the
synonymous nature of this passage (I sa 53:9a and/ or 9b) is made plausible if not
probable by issues of context and structural and literary features that do not
change regardless of how the poetics are labeled or counted. Por Isaiah in particular
see Robert H. O'Connell, Cot/cent,icity ami ContinNity. The Literary StructNre of Isaiab
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994. For surveys of theories of OT poetic
techniques see among many other valuable or classic books and articies, \Xiilfred G.
E. Watson, Cla.fIical Hehreu! Poetry, .JSOTS Supplement Series (Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 2 nJ edition, 1986); James I" Kugel, The Idea of Biblical Poetry:
Paralle/ism and Its History (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Robert
;\Iter, The Art of Biblica! Poetry (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Robert Lowth,
Leelttre.f on the Sacred Poelry 0/ the HebreJPJ, trans!' G. Gregory, 2 vols. (NewYork:
Garland, 1971 reprint of 1787 ed.); and T". A. Schi)kcl, A A1artual 0/ HehrelJ) Poetics
(Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1988).
18 See, e.g., North, The Second Isaiab, 231, who notes the alliteration; Baltzer,
Deuterojesaja, 527, who points out the reversal of the consonants lJibi r-.r-' and
it:JlJ '-.I~r was previously observed by Gesenius. )Jorth makes no more out of this
than to defer to an emendation to lJi 'iDlJ "those doing evil." Baltzer only

lVL\RLOWE: TIlE \XhCKED \X/EALTHY TN TSAT AH

53:9

79

comments on this word-play in passing and agrees that the "rich" is somehow
related to an "evil doer" ("Frevler"); then moves on to what he considers the most
pressing exegetical matter for ulis verse, the plurality of "death" in 9aii.
19 The Arabic cognate 'sr ("wicked") could suggest a I Iebrew consonantal
homograph (liD.l.l) that is used just this one time in the OT literary corpus.
In transmission it could have been corrupted to 1'ib.l.l (and this form is a
hapax in Isaiah). Of course this is highly conjectural. Cf. J. A. Alexander, The
Prophecies of Isaiah, 2 vols. in one (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing
House, 1976 rpt. of 1953 ed.), II: 301-302; and Delitzsch, Isaiah, II: 327
~orth (The Second Isaiah, 231) cites A. Guillaume's reference to Arabic JuOY"
"rabble" or "refuse of mankind." Cf. A. Guillaume, "A Contribution to
Hebrew Lexicography," in Bulletin 0/ the School of Oriental and African Studies
XVI/l (1954): 10. For the "demons"hypothesis see D. W Thomas, "A
Consideration of Is 53 in the Light of Recent Textual and Philological Study,"
Bphetnerides Theologicae Lovanienses 44 (1968), 79-86.
20 The entire phrase "and with a wealthy one [or 'the wealthy'] in his
deaths" is usually deemed unintelligible, so re-punctuation is resorted to
automatically (inQ~ bamuti) instead of1Db:J bi!motuw), since the change
affects only the removal of one letter, d,eyod from the MT. This changes the
meaning to "his burial mound" or "his sepulcher"(following Albright's
proposal). Cf. Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40-55,348 and R. N. Whybray, Isaiah 4066, The New Century Bible (London: Nrarshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1975), 178,
both who cite WE Albright's 1957 essay in The High Place in Ancient Palestine,
Volume du Congres: Strasbourg, VTSPIp 4 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957),242-58,
and noting that this option may also be supported by 1Qlsa" Since this
approach preserves the consonantal text, \vith the minor exception of the
removal of a vowel letter which may have been inserted later by the Naqdanim,
it is arguable and plausible that here we are dealing with a lexical rather than
transcriptional error (although accepting that the vowel points were applied
to thc wrong word, the authoritative consonantal text remains unchanged).
Rather than reading preposition =+ "death/s"(nitJ) + possessive
pronominal suffix 3ms (waw), the root is iTtJ:J "back, hill, ridge, high place">
nltJ:J "high place(s)" or "great high place(s)."Therli suffix may be interpreted
otherwise as feminine or abstract (Ugatitic cognate is bmt, "back"). One wonders
why not just suggest inb:J "in his death"as better alternative, since "[d,e]
rich [one]" is singular morphologically if not functionally.
21
BDB wonders if "funeral mound" is the meaning in Ezek 43:7, a
passage among a few others that Albright considered to validate nitJ:J as
"funeral mounds" or "tombs." Cf. L. Koehler and W Baumgartner, gen.
eds., The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, .5 vols., rev. W
Baumgartner and J. J. Stamm et aI., trans!' M .E. J. Richardson, et al. (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1994-20(0), S.v. iTr-:J, where one meaning given is "Canaanite
grave" (cf. Ezek 43:7; and Job 27:15 as a conjecture). Still this view is currently
thought unlikely by some authorities. See Willcm A. VanGemeren, gen. ed.,
New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis (Grand

80

I

The Asbury Journal 64/2 (2009)

Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1996)s.v. j1r,jJ by Martin J. Selman,
where only Isa 6:13; 53:9; and Ezek 43:7 are possible supports.
22 CE. "Is Isaiah 53:9 refering [sic] to Jesus? .. (www.geodties.com/Athensl
Agora (4229 (jsaiah htm)' but even if a collective plural or not, if the text is about
the nation, the nation may be typological of and, therefore, applicable to the
Messiah as a retrospective historical parallel (picture or anticipation or
foreshadowing). Plural collectives are known in the Hebrew OT, e.g. the wellknown 0';; ~~ "gods" used as the proper name of the one, true God. Other uses
are for intensity or abstraction. Plural collectives also are common in Arabic (cf.
Paul Joiion, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, trans. and rev. T. Muraoka, Vo!' 2, Part
Three:Syntax (Rome: Editice Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 1991),497-502. NRSV
renders ,'r1rJJ as "tomb" following the proposal of the editors of BHS. Qumran
reads 1nt:l1J. CE. Watts, Isaiah 34-66, 226; North, Second Isaiah, 231; Sapp, "The
LXX, 1QIsa, and MT Versions of Isaiah 53," 178, n. 10. Singular "death" is found
in Greek, Syriac, and Latin OT versions, as well as by Qumran and Targums.
23 IS 4 53:9 (a or b) is not mentioned in Jooe Krasovec, Antithetic Structure in
Biblical Hebrew Poetry, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 35 (Leiden: E. J. Brill.
1984).
24 E.g. see Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66, 397-98. In support of
the concessive use of the preposition ~ll, Oswalt cites Job 10:7; 16:17; and 34:6).
The point of 53:9, for Oswalt, is to highlight the final irony of this Servant's life.
He was not buried with the poor, who had been his faithful companions in life but
was surrounded in death (not burial) with those who oppressed him and whose
sins he carried (Ibid., p. 398). In this way Oswalt tries to makes sense out of the
use of "grave" in 53:9ai and "death" in 53:9aii.
25 Cf. 2 Sam 12:1-4;Job 27:13, cf. v. 19 (and note the word play between "rich"
and "ruthless"[i'iDll 'syr and r'ill 'ry$l); 31:24; Psa 49:5 (6 MT); 52:9; Prov
11:28; 18:23; 22:7, 16; 28:6, 11; Ecd 4:8; Mic 6:12 (using the same word for
"violence" as in Isa 53:9b); Amos 4:1; et al. See Schoors, Jesuja II, 326, who also
recognizes promised riches for those who fear Yahweh(psa 112:3; Prov 22:4). In
the NT cf. Mat 19:23-24; Lk 6:24 (which proves the "poor" of v. 20 are the
economically poor); 16: 19-25; 1 Tim 6: 17; J as 1:9-11; 2:5-7; 5: 1-6.
26 Exod 30:15;Jer 9:23 (22 M1); Ruth 3:10;Job 27:13 ("wicked man" parallels
"ruthless ones"); Psa 37:16 ("righteous" II plural "wicked"); 49:2 (3 MT); Prov
22:2; 28:11; Ecd 5:12 (11 M1); [ cpo Ecd 10:6 (where collective singular "fool"
parallels plural "rich")]; possibly Ecd 10:20.
27 Gesenius speaks of both "good" and "bad"wealth as options of meanings for
i'ibll. The latter is the sense of "haughty" or "impious" given that riches are a
source of pride and pride in the OT is impiety. In relation to Isa 53:9 he cites Job
27: 19, "They go to bed with wealth, butwill do so no more; they open their eyes,
and it is gone"(NRSV). Cf. Gesenius' Hebrew-Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament,
trans!. Samuel P. Tregelles (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1949),
S.v. i'ibll. DCH stilI lacks the volume containing this Hebrew term (cf. David J.
A. Clines, gen. ed., The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, 5 vols. (Sheffield: Sheffield
University Press, 1993-2001), hereafter DCH. Vol. 6 is forthcoming (November
2007).
28 Exod 30:15(where the arthrous and collective singular form appears for
"rich" and "poor"); 2 Sam 12:1-2, 4;Jer 9:23 (22 MT); Mic 6:12; Psa 45:12 (13
M1); 49:3; Job 27:19; Prov 10:15; 14:20; 18:11, 23; 22:2, 7, 16; 28:6, 11; Ruth
3:10; Ece! 5:11; 10:6, 20.
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North, The S ecund Isaiah, 231.
Ibid.
NRSV, JB, and NEB have "and"; ASV, NASB, KjV, NKJV, Wv, NAB,

-Vulgate, and LXX have "nor"

Of

"neither."

" See David Noel Freedman, "\1(;'hat the Ass and the Ox Know-But the
Scholars Don't," Bible Review 1:1 (February 19R5):42-43.
Cf. Gen 16:5 where NIV has "wrong" (also .lob 19:7; 21:27; Prov 8:36). In
several passages this term is used in a contexl of false speech (e.g. Exod 23;1; Deut
19:16; Jer 51:46; Mie 6:12; Psa 27:12; 35:11). See Koehler and Baumgartner,
Lexicon, s.v. D1Jn, where the following verses arc given for this term meaning a
witness who does wrong or false witness: Exod 23:1; Deut 19:16; Psa 35:11.
There is a homograph (II Dtln) that means "devise,"and this fits the context
better, although this is speculative and not firmly fixed in Hebrew lexicography. It
can be considered, however, as a possible solution. Cf. Koehler and Baumgartner,
s.v. Dtln II, which compares Syriac /:tmas"to dev-ise"; and Arabic hamasa "to
mumble"; cf. Job 21:27, "
the schemes by which you would wrong [Dtln]me."
Cf. VanGemeren, f\JIDOTT£, s.v. II Dtln, by John E. Hartley, which word is said
to mean "think, invent" (cf. Syriac "meditate, muse, study"); the verb in Job 21:27
is said to be related to this Syriac cognate. DCH mentions this verse and others in
Job in relation toIIDtln, but in line with its lexical philosophy gives no etymological
data.
,. For 53:9bii NAB has "spoken any falsehood"; NEB "spoken no word of
treachery"; JB "no perjury in his mouth."
35 Cf. Job 2:9-3:1; Prov 4:24; 6:12; 13:3; 17:27;18:7; Ecd 5:2,6; 6:11; 9:17;
10:12, 13; 1:10.
36 Cf. Matt 6:7; 12:34, 37; 15: 11.
37 o~ GflOpTiov OUK ETIoill(JEV cf. ihl avofl(av OUK ETIoi1]<TEv. This influenced
the Vulgate, "he had done no iniquity"(imquitatem non fecerit).
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A Review Essqy: The Church and Postmodern Culture
Serzes
Who's Afraid of Postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault
to Church
James K.A. Smith
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic
2006, 156 pp. softcover, $17.99
What Would Jesus Deconstruct? The Good News of Postmodernism
for the Church
JohnD. Caputo
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic
2007, 160 pp. softcover, $19.99
GloboChrist: The Great Commission Takes a Postmodern Turn
Carl Raschke
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic
2008, 175 pp. softcover, $17.99
Baker Academic, under the direction of James K.A. Smith, is partway
through publishing The Church and Postmodern Culture series. The series, with
three of an anticipated seven books published, aims to capitalize on the
opportunity that postmodernity (the cultural phenomenon) provides to
rethink church comprehensively utilizing postmodernism (the philosophical
movement). Pastors, specialists, lay members are all welcome to read and
explore where continental philosophy meets the church. The books are offered,
Smith says, "as French lessons for the church." This review essay examines
the fIrst three books of the series, Who'sAfraid of Postmodernism? What Would
Jesus Deconstruct?, and GloboChrist, offering overall thematic strengths and
weaknesses of the series.
Who's Afraid of Postmodernism?
James Smith's Who! Afraid of Postmodernism? kicks the series off by
considering postmodernism's most recognized mottos: "There is nothing
outside the text;" "Postmodernism is incredulity toward metanarratives;"
and "Power is knowledge." Smith begins with Derrida's claim that "there is
82
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nothing outside the text," which he reads as saying there is nothing that is
not interpreted via language (39). A consequent practice of deconstruction,
then, allows the church to break up the world as it is interpreted by
contemporary culture (57-58). Smith sees in modernity a danger for loneranger Christianity, and Derrida's belief that all interpretation is community
governed is a welcome practice for the church as she seeks the guidance of the
Spirit (58).
N ext Smith urges his readers to see Lyotard's claim that postmodernism
is incredulity toward metanarratives as a deep skepticism, not toward the scope
of stories, but toward the legitimation of stories by appeal to universal reason
available to any smart and virtuous individual (67-68). Postmodernism's
belief that all narratives are culturally and temporally conditioned does not
negate whether or not something is true, only the certainty with which it is
known. If all knowledge is narratively based, then Christianity can boldly
proclaim its cultural, temporal, and universal story without appealing to
something beyond it (70-71). Not only can the church preach in humility and
confidence, but the church must do so.
Third, Smith defends Foucault's claim that "power is knowledge" as the
belief that communities form truth claims based on the structures already
found therein. Knowledge is never neutral. Now, one can read Foucault as a
Nietzschean-power is neither good nor bad--describingpower's role in culture,
or as an Enlightenment liberal-power is bad and please take your hands of
my individual autonomy-prescribing roadmaps for a better society (96-97).
Smith reads Foucault as the latter, but defends power, and the role it plays in
formation by institutions. Smith's critique of one flavor of the emerging
church-denominations shouldn't tell us how to run our churches and
churches shouldn't tell people how to run their lives!-results in a defense of
formation through discipline. If Foucault is right, Smith says that it's not a
matter of whether or not there will be power, discipline, and formation, but
who will do it and what direction it will go. The answer to a culture forming
sexualized, publicized, and electronically networked people is not no
formation, but formation with the proper telos in focus-Jesus (106-7).
All of this gathers the role of the church as a confessional community,
relying not on universal reason, but revelation; preaching Christ rather than
demonstrating the faith's correlation to absolute truth. Smith is more
concerned that the church put forth something worth adjudicating than who
gets to adjudicate. ''We confess knowledge without certainty and truth without
objectivity" (121). Though postmodernity has not completely supplanted
modernity, it haunts it. We like penicillin and anesthesia but we are keenly
aware that, as Stanley Hauerwas has said, we won't make it out of life alive.
Faced with a postmodern culture preoccupied with death, individualism, and
skepticism, Smith says we preach, practice, and perform the story ofJesus.
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w:hat Would Jesus Deconsttuct?
Next, John Caputo seeks to show how deconstruction can help save the
church as an institution by reflecting on the four words of the book's title,
What WouldJesus Deconstruct? Caputo argues that the "bite" of the would must
be felt by those who first ask the question (24). What wouldJ esus do? Certainly
not capitalize on the profitability of such a slogan! Caputo urges that we keep
this question open refusing to give quick answers because while deconstruction
does not deny that there is a path, or way, to God, it does believe that the path
is covered by many footprints (38). This is the "plain sense of the plurality of
things" (41). Caputo illustrates this with the French word pas, which can
mean either 'step' or 'not.' Deconstruction answers the question "What is the
beyond?" with "Pas." But does this mean a step or nothing? Precisely: the
"step/not beyond" (42-46). This is the path walked by deconstruction.
Caputo clarifies this step/not by distinguishing between events and names.
Events have happened and are still happening. They are vocative-but though
they call to us and we call to them, they are beyond our reach. Names, on the
other hand, are existential. They are the natural order of real things (58-59).
!This is not a defense of realism. Caputo affirms with Derrida that what is
beyond, the step/not, is beyond real; it is "hyper-real" (39).] Names must
always be deconstructed in order to hear and continue striving for the event.
For example, what passes under the name democracy must always be
deconstructed so that the event of democracy is always pursued (61). True
democracy, along with gifts, hospitality, justice, forgiveness, and love, is
impossible. Our names for these events are never the events themselves and
must always be deconstructed and in this deconstruction we see their
impossibility and thereby practice them as expressions, but only expressions,
of the impossible. Relentlessly pursuing these impossibilities is a type of
"madness" for the Kingdom that is the uniqueness of Jesus (86-87). He
pursues these things and his Kingdom is just such an impossibility.
So, what would Jesus deconstruct? Caputo highlights Christianity's (mainly
in the form of the Religious Right's) approach to war, abortion, and
homosexuality. What is good is impossible because, for example, justice calls
to us and our name for justice is simply a lesser evil. One might need to resort
to war at times, but while it is justified, it is never just (101). Likewise, while
Caputo is against abortion, he admits that it might be the lesser evil (115).
Caputo seems less complicated regarding homosexuality, however. Quite
simply, the Greeks were right and the Christian/Jewish tradition was wrong
(109). While we have no reason to think Jesus would have taught differently
from Judaism (108), his gospel oflove would today find love in homosexual
relationships (109).
Caputo finishes by examining two churches in light of his apology for a
deconstruction of Christianity. These churches struggle to live out the
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Kingdom of God in their contexts while it is impossible. The good news is
that by deconstructing Christianity the church can continue living into the
impossibility of the Kingdom of God (137-38). With this summary in
place, let's turn to a critique.
Caputo's ability to communicate complex subjects with humor is
undeniable. He is a gifted philosopher. However, several problems are equally
evident. First, Caputo urges that the impossibility of knowing the path to
God makes one's tentative steps possible as steps of faith. While some worry
that this path leads nowhere, Caputo is quite right to say that deconstruction
does not lead to nihilism. Even though one never knows where it will lead,
it will lead somewhere. Now, this may be an appropriate approach for one
exploring the Christian faith or Islam or Judaism, but it is not appropriate for
one determined to follow the way ofJesus. When Jesus announces that he is the
way, he is the deconstructor of all paths but his alone. While deconstruction
can still apply to all attempts to follow this Jesus, the resurrected Jesus is not
tentative in where he is leading. He is leading to the Father. He calls people to
repent and follow. The One whom Jesus reveals is one with Jesus. If you
have seen Jesus, you have seen the Father. The step/not beyond has taken flesh
in Jesus.
Second, Caputo falls into the Enlightenment camp through his defense
of homosexuality and his critique of Scripture. Caputo grounds his defense
of homosexuality by "invoking the spirit of a certain Jesus" and "the basis
of critical reasoning" (109). But whose critical reasoning? And which Jesus?
Certainly not the historical Jewish Messiah nor the critical reasoning of the
majority of Christians. Because Caputo is not making an appeal from the
Christian tradition, but an appeal to common sense (available to all?), he is
continuing the Enlightenment project. We should all agree on homosexuality
once we've reasoned well enough, right? From here, Caputo rightly assumes
that people will wonder exactly what status he believes of Scripture when he
believes homosexual love should be accepted by Christians, even though
Scripture teaches against it. He answers by saying that he is not an "idolater"
(110). Whatever status one affords Scripture, one cannot put a book before
God who is wholly other. But if Caputo rejects aspects of the Bible and the
broad tradition of followers of the God whom he claims to worship, can
Caputo be worshiping this same God? And if he rejects aspects of the
biblical teaching, then from where does Caputo's understanding of God
come? This seems a Christian religion without the bounds of Scripture and
within the bounds of Caputo's reason.
Perhaps ifDerrida could say that he rightly passed for an atheist, then one
can read Caputo and say he rightly passes for a Christian. Caputo is devoted
to the church and follows (his interpretation of) the way of Jesus. But one
still wonders: Who does Caputo believe Jesus to be? Could this Jesus, right
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now, deconstruct Christianity personally or would it simply be the memory of
Jesus that deconstructs Christianity? Caputo wants to live out the teaching of
Jesus with habits that Jesus would recognize today (112), but why doesn't
Caputo think that this is exacdywhat the Religious Right, Caputo's favorite
target, is doing?
GloboChrist
Carl Raschke's GloboChristis a most appropriate third installment of the
series. Raschke's call for radical Christians to take their love to the world nicely
follows Smith's desire for a confessional witness of the Christian faith. This
love must be as radical as the devotion of radical Muslims and reflect the
radical difference between these religions. As Raschke says, the "differences
make the difference" (115). Raschke's work is also a strong counterpoint to
Caputo's work because Raschke is devoted to Jesus of Nazareth crucified,
resurrected, and, most ilnportandy, coming again.
Christ Jesus is becoming the GloboChrist. Contrary to the religious critics
of the death of God movement, secularism has not moved the world over.
Rather, religion is making a comeback. Controversially, Raschke believes that
mass communication, globalization, religious and political upheaval is not
something Christ is working against, but a way he is showing his relational
power. "Christ is showing his power not just among the nations but also for
the nations" (19). Yet religion has not taken this ally in its propagation
neutrally. While it utilizes globalization, religion also battles against
globalization because of its secular flavor. As a result, the clash of civilizations
is not between religions, as Samuel Huntington believed, but between the
religious and the secular. With the upsurge of Christianity and Islamism,
religion is winning (32). That said, the clash will inevitably come between
these distinct religions and their radically different eschatologies (139).
GloboChrist is Raschke's critique of the West's anemic versions of Christian
faith and his brave challenge that Christians become radical, relational,
revelatory, and rhizomic in order to fight Islam as we watch and wait for the
ICingdom of God in the return of Jesus. This is the Globopomo moment.
Let's focus on Raschke's two most important contributions. Pirst, Raschke
moves beyond deconstruction to the semiotic project of Gilles Deleuze.
Deleuze uses the notion of the rhizome to illustrate the relation between
ideas. A rhizome is a subterraneous root structure that grows horizontally
that sends up shoots periodically. In applying this to Christianity, Raschke
says that globopomo mission must recognize that there is no pure gospel,
but only one that is contextualized. Similarity between expressions of the
faith, then, is not found in their being logically self-silnilar but in their having
"rhizomic" relations (40). They are related as family trees reveal relations over
generations: something unites them, butitis often difficult to see what (41).
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Raschke defends this notion as a necessary outflow ofIncatnation by saying
that the real is always relational. Christian missionaties-and yes, they are
desperately needed-must utilize indigenous religious expressions in order
to spread the gospel, not only for theological reasons, but because this is how
Christianity spread so quickly in the first three centuries.
Second, Raschke takes the Emerging Church movement head on,
challenging those who may be tempted to think that the "new kind of
Christian is simply an easier-to-get-along-with Christian" (160). Raschke writes,
"Open-mindedness, nonjudgmentalism, and radical inclusivity, ate no less
idolatrous" than "natrow-mindedness, legalism, [and] exclusivity" (159).
Raschke's relationality is always radical. Radical relationality recognizes and
believes religious differences, while believing one to be right and the other
wrong, but all with a radical devotion to love the other. This is not Gianni
Vattimo's ''weak Christianity." It is the postmodern application of mission
by a product of the Magisterial Reformation. One almost expects Raschke to
yell, ''To atms!", but instead Raschke queries, not disapprovingly, with the
words of the controversial Matk Driscoll: "[I]s the 'emerging' future of the
new evangelical Christianity .in the hands of a generation of 'whiny idealists
getting together in small groups to complain about megachurches and the
religious right rather than doing something' that will hasten the eschaton
itself?" (150). One wonders how Caputo might respond!
Reflection and Critique
The brunt of critique in this review has fallen, perhaps unfairly, on John
Caputo for two reasons. First, because his work supersedes the boundaties
of what is normally associated with Baker Academic projects. Second, because
Caputo has most thoroughly practiced one of the most important emerging
themes of this project: Preaching. Smith urges that we communicate with
confessional language and Raschke says that Christians must be about
"preaching the joyful inevitability of the coming GloboChrist, the GloboChrist
who turns back the sword of Islam. "(150). Caputo does not simply talk
about preaching; he preaches/Thus my critique attempts to capture the true
strength of the series: It has something to say and it demands response. It preaches
and it stirs me to preach, but not in the way of modernity, which, I believe
Peter Leithart has said, "thunders from the pulpit." This is Incatnational,
relational, active preaching. It is full bodied preaching. I hope the Church and
Postmodern Culture series continues in this regard.
On the other hand, the series is not readily accessible for as wide an audience
as they hope. For those with eyes to read, however, it is this challenge that
both draws Christians into the postmodern conversation and provides space
for readers to think about their own vocations. While each book reviewed
here flnishes with sections that focus on local churches with Smith's
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enthusiasm for radical orthodoxy, Caputo's praise for St Malachy's and the
"Ikon" assembly in I3elfasl, and Raschke's critique of emergent Christianity,
the series still struggles to draw the academy and the church closer together.
However, this shortcoming allows for ret1ective and effective practitioners to
find their place as practical d'leologians.l do not know how Smidl and Raschke
would fare as preachers or how Caputo would fare as pastor, but their work
can make embolden preachers in d'leir proclamation and encourage pastors in
their discipleship, thereby facilitating the call of more preachers, pastors, and
professional thinkers. The series deconstmcts itself by always calling for more
participants.
A second critique is that the three contributors so far are all men working
in a North American context. Would it not be better to have alternative voices
and geographical contexts? Perhaps not. First, while these are all North
American men, they do not always agree. Caputo roves outside the Christian
tradition while Smiili emphasizes a confessional witness. Caputo relics heavily
on Jacques Derrida while Raschke opts for Gilles Deleuze. Second, these men
are working in the context for which they are writing. Perhaps the people who
need to read this series arc best served listening to others in their context who
ably provide resources to begin critiquing that this is (and is expected to be for
future contributions) a "guys only" group. Perhaps we could see that the
current (and expected) contributors aim to deconstruct the series itself by
making it clear that more needs to be written and read and practiced. This is not
meant to be seen as a final word because we haven't yet heard from another
gender or the rest of the world! The series deconstmcts itself by offering a
certain uniformity of voices.

Conclusion
Toward the end of the series preface, Smith asks, "\'Vhat does Paris have
to do with Jerusalem?" The challenge T faced as I paced myself through some
of the tough reading was "What does Paris have to do with Johnson City,
New York?" I thought of people in my church who would hear my sermons,
sit in our small groups, and raise money for their teens. The challenge (and it
is a challenge) of every reader of the Chtlrc}; and Po.r/modern Ctlittlre series is to
ask this same question in the hope that God's Spirit makes the connection
clear and shapes our worship and witness of dle resurrected Jesus-even
through our institutions.
Aaron Perry is a doctoral student in biblical studies at Asbury Theological
Seminarv in Wilmore, Kentcky.
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A Revzew Essqy: The Life qf Christ

For 75 years, from the time 1 took New Testament Survey at Wheaton
College under Edith Torrey in the mid-30s, untill retired from teaching in
the early 70s, no year passed without my reading a half-dozen books on the
Life of Christ. As a matter of fact, my retirement didn't change that. A couple
of months ago, I finished reading Walter Wangerin's The Book of God, which
is a novel covering the entire Bible, and which devotes the last 200 pages to
the New Testament. And I'm now waiting for Anne Rice to finish her thrcevolume set on Christ the Lord. I've read the first two volumes and will read
the third when it comes off the press.
Long ago, I started classifying the lives of Christ r read. There were lives
of Christ that were mere lists of dates and events. These lacked personality.
There were, at the other end of the spectrum, those that were written solely
to express disdain: I rejected these as demonstrations of spiteful malice.
Frederick Niets"che fell into this category. His ideali:.<ing of the Superman
was a worship of power; Jesus dared to describe himself as 'meek and lowly
of heart,' and Nietszche flew into a cold rage at such a display.
Closely associated with this type of presentation is that of Sigmund
Freud, who wrote in his Future of an Illusion that any type of religion was
infantile and unworthy. Freud's analysis renders any kind of human life
abnormal. For example, if you are characteristically late to everything, you are
dilatory; if you are ten minutes early for all events, you are an eager beaver; if
you are always on time, you are compulsive. You can't win through to normalcy
because there is no such a thing! Perhaps that was because Freud's data base
was his own patients, of whom he used a dozen or so to set up his theories.
The latest release of books from the Crossings book club has two
rehearsals of the Life of Christ. One is a sorting of the gospel data into
chronological order; the other is a coffee table book that adds art to history
from the American Bible Society. The first, by Ed Stewart, compiler, and
titled Jesus 365: Experiencing the Four Gospels as One Single Story is not the way
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the church down through the ages has read the story of Christ's life. Stewart
homogenizes the data; the people of God have savored the differences.
Garry Wj]]s has taken a different path than Steward, a path more in line
with the history of the church's interpretations. In his life of Christ (',YJliat tlie
Gospels lvleant) he quotes Raymond E. Brown's rendition of the passion of
Christ (A Crucified C:hriJt in Holy Week) where Brown deals with the demand
that all the strands of the Gospels be woven together: 'When these different
Passion narratives are read side by side, one should not be upset by the
contrast or ask which view of Jesus is more correct: the Marcan Jesus, who
plumbs the depth of abandonment only to be vindicated; the Lucan Jesus,
who worries about others and gently dispenses forgiveness; or the J ohannine
Jesus, who reigns victoriously from the cross in control of all that happens.
All three arc given to us by the inspiring Spirit, and no one of them exhausts
the meaning of Jesus. A true picture of the whole emerges only because the
views of it are different. To choose one portrait of the crucified Jesus, in a
manner that would exclude the other portrayals, or to harmonize all the
Gospel portrayals into one, would deprive the cross of much of its meaning.
It is important that some be able to see the head bowed in dejection, while
others observe the arms outstretched in forgiveness, and still others perceive
in the title on the cross the proclamation of a reigning ICing." And Wills
eloquently ends his book by answering his own question: "How to read the
Gospels? As a whole, with the reverence they derive from and address, yet
with the intelligence God gave us to help us End him."
I cannot read a Life of Christ rapidly. Usually, I read a book in tempo with
its type: I skim a book until it has proved that it deserves the respect of careful
reading. Some chapters can be exhausted by reading the first and the last
paragraphs. With some books I read no more than the publisher's blurb, the
introduction, and the preface; then I know it has no interest for me and I
return it to the shelf whence I took it. But the majority of the Lives of Christ,
even those written by authors who despised the Nazarene, I read slowly. I
know of no other class of literature I approach in this fashion, and I have
never bothered to ask lJJhy.
I read each volume of the Life of Christ with a sense of the author's
presence. That varies: I approach GK.Chesterton's Tbe E1Jeria.rtil1;:Afatlwith a
different mind-set than I bring to Sholcm Asch's The
To neither
one am I rejecting: I simply itemize what I think they will bring to the subjectmatter and then verify my expectation. In a sense, I do that with all books,
but I do it more intentionally with tllese books than with any other genre.
One fact on which all the lives of Christ agree is that Jesus was born and
lived in poverty. Anne Rice at the close of her Erst volume on the life of
Christ (Christ the Lord: Out ofE/fypt) imagines Mary speaking to Jesus after
his visit to the Temple when he was 12: '~'\nd now you come home with us
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to Nazareth. Not back to the Temple. Oh, I know how much you want to
stay at the Temple. Tknow: But no. The Lord in Heaven did not send you to
the house of a teacher in the Temple or a priest in the Temple or a scribe or a
rich Pharisee. He sent you to Joseph bar Jacob, dIe carpenter, and his betroilied,
Mary of the Tribe of David in Nazareth. And you come home to Nazareth
with us,"
I have never lived in poverty, so I do not know from experience what it is
to be poor or what it is not to know when I'm going to get my next meal. I
have read much about such things. For example, Rudyard ICipling, in his
book on the half-Irish, half-Indian Kim, relates that Kim always wanted to be
with his impoverished friends rather than his high-placed English
acquaintances during the vacations. For Kim, ilie fellowship of the poor was
vasdy superior to life among middle-class British.
\X1hi.ch brings me to the question, What do I do with these Lives of
Christ? They say to me:
Love as Jesus loved;
Intend with the mind-set Jesus used;
Respond to oiliers as Jesus responded.
For a while, some suggested that we use the question, WhatwouldJesus do?
as a clearinghouse for our behavior. But Jesus lived 2000 years ago. His ideas
of hygiene do not accord with ours. His cultural patterns clash with those of
the 20'h century. His dress would set him apart from those who wear jeans
and T-shirts. His sandals would be ill-suited to Minnesota snmv.
Jesus himself left us in no doubt. Love. ''A new command I give you," he
said [fohn 15.12]. It is the urgency and the emphasis that are new, for ilie
form of the command goes back to the law of Moses; indeed it goes back to
the nature of God.
Paul called it "a far better way." His description of the way of love is
sublime: [1 Corn 1.1.1-13]
"IfI speak with human eloquence and angelic ecstasy but don't
love, I'm nothing but the creaking of a rusty gate.
"If I speak God's word \viili power, revealing all his mysteries
and making everything plain as day, and if I have faiili that says
to a mountain 'Jump,' and it jumps, but I don't love I'm
nothing.
"If I give everything I own to ilie poor and even go to the
stake to be burned as a martyr, but T don't love, I've gotten
nowhere.
"So, no matter what I say, what I believe, and what I do, I'm
bankrupt without love.
"Love never gives up. Love cares more for others than for self.
"Love doesn't want what it doesn't have. Love doesn't strut.
"Love doesn't have a swelled head, doesn't force itself on
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others, isn't always 'me first,' doesn't fly otI the handle, doesn't
keep score of the sins of others, doesn't revel when others
t,'Tovel.
"Loves takes pleasure in the flowering of truth, puts up with
anything, trusts God always, always looks for the best, never
looks back, but keeps going to the end.
"Love never dies. Inspired speech will be over some day; praying
in tongues will end; understanding will reach its limit. \Ve
know only a portion of the truth, and what we say about God
is always incomplete. But when the Complete arrives, our
incompletes \\Jill be canceled.
"\Vhen I was an infant at my mother's breast, I gurgled and
cooed like an infant. When I grew up, I left those infant ways
for good.
"We don't yet see things clearly. We're squinting in a fog, peering
through a mist. But it won't be long before the weather clears
and the sun shines bright. We'll see it all then, see it all as clearly
as God sees us, knowing him directly just as he knows us!
"But for right now, until that completeness, we have three
things to do to lead us to that consummation: Trust steadily in
God, hope unswervingly, love extravagantly. i\nd the best of
the three is love." (Eugene Peterson's paraphrase)
As to the intentions Jesus brought to his life, they, too, come clear in the
majority of those who write his life. Echoing Isaiah, and rebuking the
imperialist aims of his disciples, Jesus told them: lMatt 25.24-28]
"You've observed how godless rulers throw their weight
around, how quickly a little power goes to their heads. It's not
going to be that way with YOLl. \Vhoever wants to be great
must become a servant. \Vhoever wants to be first among you
must be your slave. That is what the Son oLMan has done: He
came to serve, not be served
and then to give away his life
in exchange for the many who are held in hostage."
Jesus was under no illusions. He came to earth to die. In perhaps the
greatest drama of all time-maybe of all eternity-he employed death to
defeat Death. The road he took to the Cross was the road of servitude. I lis
choice was deliberate; he knew what he was doing. I wonder: when did it
come clear to him? Anne Rice thinks it was on his way home from the
episode at the Temple when he was 12. Wangerin suggests that it was during
tlle wedding feast at Cana of Galilee. I think it was when he "set his face to go
to Jerusalem." That's the KingJames; The l'v1eJJage renders it, "When it came
close to the time for his Ascension, he gathered up his courage and steekd
himself for the journey to Jerusalem."
Tlike the way Anne Rice sets tlle contrast: "In sum, the whole case for the
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non-divine Jesus who stumbled into Jerusalem and somehow got crucified
by nobody and had nothing to do with the founding of Christianity and
would be horrified byitifhe knew about it
that whole picrure which had
floated in the liberal circles 1 frequented as an atheist for 30 years
that case
was not made."
And why was it not made? "He set his face to go to Jerusalem." 1 have a
great deal of sympathy with Thomas who reacted to this stubbornness with
unbelieving loyalty: [John 11.16] "Come along. We might as well die with
him." Jesus' recognition that he must die, and his determination to do so as
Jewish scripture predicted form a watershed for those who write the story of
his life.
I first moved out of this unbelieving loyalty to an understanding that
Christ went to the Cross with deliberation when I was in college. I was
reading G. Campbell Morgan's The Crises of the Christ. When it came to the
story of the Transfiguration, [Luke 9.28-36] the topic of the conversation
between Jesus, Moses, and Elijah was "the decease which he should
accomplish at Jerusalem." That's the King James Version. None of the
modern versions captures the force ofI(jng James, which emphasizes the
awkwardness of a man's accomplisbing his death. J was so struck by this that,
later, I preached on it. My congregation was not enthralled by my sermon:
several thought 1 should stick to topics that were less strange.
At 93 years of age I view my death as imminent, but I do not consider it
an accomplishment. It will be a nuisance, but 1 do not seek either to hasten it
or delay it. Since 1 don't have a vote in the matter, 1 don't waste energy
contemplating it. But Christ had a different intention about his death. In the
passage about the good shepherd, [John 10.1-21] he says:
"1 am the Good Shepherd. I lmow my own sheep and my
own sheep know me. In the same way, the Father knows
me and I know the Father. I put the sheep before myself,
sacrificing myself if necessary. You need to know that I
have other sheep in addition to those in this pen. I need
to gather and bring them too. They'll also recognize my
voice. Then it will be one flock, one shepherd. That is why
the Father loves me: because I freely lay down my life. And
so I am free to take it up again. Noone takes it from me.
I lay it down of my own free will. I have the right tolay it
down: 1 also have the right to take it up again. I received
this authority personal1y from my Father"
I sympathize with Jesus' disciples' confusion at such words. Nor has the
confusion lessened a great deal over the years. For example, who are the
"other sheep" our Lord is referring to? Are they the Muslims? Are they those
who, not having heard, have yet believed?
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But consider, not what he is not saying, but what he is saying: he is
asserting his ownership: "My own sheep." I am comforted by Jesus' insistence
that he knows his sheep and calls them by name. I do not plumb the depths
of such knowledge. I understand why my farmer uncles and aunts forbade
their children to name any of the animals that were destined to end up on the
dining room table. "I couldn't eat a bite that noon," one of my cousins told
me. "I had named that hen and she came when I called her. I cried when she
was killed."
Cosmically, I do not know how literally I may take the Psalmist [-1474]
when he sings praise to the Lord who "Counts the stars and assigns each a
name,"
But Jesus knows my name, and yours, and promises to care for us.
'iX/hen Jesus says that he has the right to lay down his life as well as to take
it up again, he parts company with us. \'Ve do not have such control. Nor do
I want it. Jesus had to choose between what he wanted and what was the will
of his Father. It was not an easy choice, and the conclusion was never foregone.
We should never read a life of Christ and confuse the possession of "all
power" with "being carried to the sky on flow'r)' beds of ease!"
We come to the third use of the Life of Christ genre of literature. It is to
respond to others as Jesus responded. This includes both loving and
intending. It excludes, as we have seen, the accidents of how he dressed and
conducted his manner of life.
The essence of the Godhead is love, as John the apostle said [I John 4.17 -1 IlJ
"God is love. When we take up permanent residence in a
life of love, we live in God and God lives in us. TillS way,
love has the mn of the house, becomes at home and mature
in us so that we're free of worry on Judgment Da) -our
standing in the world is identical with Christ's. There is no
room in love for fear. Well-formed love banishes fear. Since
fear is crippling, a fearful life-fear of death, fear of
judgment-is one not yet fully forrned in love."
When one's view of God does not put love first, that misconception
leads to such events as the Inquisition, the Holocaust, and American slavery,
or, indeed, any kind of slavery. The Inquisition was performed by organized
Christianity that thought that righteousness could be achieved by punishment.
That was the same mind-set that prompted George Bush to bomb Iraq. The
Holocaust was Hitler's idea of ridding society of the Jews; his public relations
justification was tllat he was doing Germany a favor. And the lunerican South
considered that an enslaved Negro was God's notion of a proper society.
Jesus said, of lhose who crucified him, "Father, forgive them; for they
know not what the) do." I think IllS prayer overrode that of those who
crucified him, who said, "Ilis death be on us and on our children." Jesus
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promised the repentant thief, ''You will be with me in Paradise." He acted
with total disregard to the ritual laws that would make him unclean by touching
bleeding women, lepers, and dead bodies.
We adopt Jesus' perspective in the parable of the Good Samaritan, that
the sight of bleeding, damaged victims stirs compassion. Therefore we will
join in the singing of that new song that the Apostle John foresaw in his
vision of our Hnal society: [Rev 5.9-10]
''You are worthy to take the scroll and open its seals, because
you were slain and with your blood you purchased men and
women for God from every tribe and language and people and
nation. You have made them to be a kingdom and priests to
serve our God, and they will reign on the earth."
He's talking about us.

Webster C. Muck is professor of psychology emeritus at Bethel College in
St. Paul, Minnesota.
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Book Notes
Matt Tomlinson
In God's Image: The Metaculture of Fijian Christianity
2009 Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press
Reviewed ry MichaelA. Rynkiewich
Tomlinson's narrative is called ethnography in Anthropology; the description
of the culture of a single society, with a focus dictated, in part, by the interests
of the people being described. Fiji, as a nation, has a problem. The British
colonizers permitted the Fijians to own their own land, but because of that,
the Fijians saw no need to work as slaves for the British. The British then
brought in Indians from elsewhere in the Empire to work as servants and
labourers. Now, fifty some years after independence, the population is about
50 percent Fijian and 50 percent Indian, or Indo-Fijian. Business belongs to
the Indians, and the land belongs to the Fijians. The political debate has been
punctuated by three violent coups, events unique in the Pacific Islands.
Fiji, in a sea of islands, is intimately linked to Tonga and Samoa, a triangle
in which Polynesian culture developed and from which it spread thousands
of years ago. All three are predominately Christian, specifically Wesleyan/
Methodist, although in recent years the Mormon Church has grown with
speed. In local, that is, district and village, settings, there is also a sense of leqa
(pronounced leng-ga) or 'trouble' The trouble is "social disunity, which leads
to the loss of power" (5). The conceptual structure of this trouble reveals
itself in the analysis of discourse: past/present, lotu/ vanua, capitalism/
communalism, democracy/chieftaincy, Fijian/Indo-Fijian. The theme
Tomlinson develops in the book is this: "The metacultural distinction between
the lotu (Christianity) and the vanua (a complex domain encompassing chiefs,
their people, land, and tradition) is a profoundly consequential one in Fiji" (6).
Fijians consider the people of the past to have been, at once, pagans and
powerful. That makes their spirits still dangerous, and yet their time looms
larger than life with a unity that, regrettably, has now been lost. Christianity is
perceived to be responsible for this loss of unity, but also to hold the
possibility of reconstituting community. Sometimes this hope takes ethnic
form: "to be Fijian, the claim goes, one must be indigenous and Christian"
(7). So, a culture (linguistic domains and discourse that shapes perceptions
and behavior) about culture (interpretations of the past and the present) has
developed that wresdes with these dichotomies.
96
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Tomlinson's concluding third section of the book deals with ways that
the church has been involved in metacultural debates. "My goal is to understand
the context in which riotous and destructive acts can seem to many local
observers to be the positive acts of moral Christians" (27). Many in the
church are exploring new ways to understand Fijian society and the place of
the past, the Indo-Pijians, the processes of modernization, and the enduring
chiefs in a new configuration that does not lead to the violence of the coups.
Tomlinson tells the extended narrative of a catechist who had a dramatic
conversion demonstrating God's power in and over the events shaping his
life, and in particular reshaping some of the dichotomies that characterize
Fijian metaculture. If the church caused a loss of power in the past, it may be
the church that reconnects Fijians with power in the future. However, in an
otherwise fine ethnography, Tomlinson fails to help the reader see how a
personal conversion and coming into power will affect the larger narrative of
how society should operate. A failure shared too often by the church in other
eras in other lands.
In the past, doing anthropological ±leldwork placed researchers in emerging
Christian societies populated with missionaries and indigenous pastors. But,
the anthropologist, bent on discovering what this culture was like before the
arrival of the missionary, the administratof and the trader, saw the missionary
as in intruder seeking to change the culture she wanted to recover. Christianity
was in the way of solid anthropological research and that put anthropologists
at odds with the missionary enterprise. The result was ethnographies in
which missionaries were not even present or ethnographies in which
missionaries wefe the bad guys.
There is now a new movement, beginning around 1990, called The
Anthropology of Christianity. The movement reflects the postmodern turn,
in which everyone is deconstructed (in tius case, the antl-lropological enterprise)
and everyone has a voice (even if Christianity no longer has a privileged voice).
Joel Robbins, who worked in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, has
fostered the movement with his Becoming Sinners: Christianity and"'ioral Torment
in a Papua Neu) Guinea S oriety leading a wave of young ethnographers who
treat "local Christianities" as a given fact and, with a more neutral pose than
their predecessors, proceed to describe the culture and society that exists in the
present. Tomlinson's book is one of many in the series Robbins edits with
the University of California Press: Webb Keane, Christian lvloderns: Freedom
and Fetish in the Mission Encounter; Matthew Engelke, A Problem of Presence:
Beyond Scripture in an African Churcb; David Smilde, Reason to Believe: Cultural
AgemJ' in I Atin American Evangelicalism; Francio Guadeloupe, Chanting Doum
tbe New Jerusalem: Calypso, Cbn'stianity, and Capitalism in tbe Caribbean; William
F. Hanks, Converting Wordr: A1aya in tbe Age of tbe Cross; and Frederick I(jaits,
Death in a Cburch of Life: lv10ral PaHion during Bof.rwana's Time of AIDS.
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These ethnographies, and others outside the series, including two readers, '
provide a new resource for missiology, and, at the same time, provide a
challenge for doctoral programs in Missiology and/ or Intercultural Studies
to do this level of research and writing.
Michael A. Rynkiewich is professor of anthropology at Asbury Theological
Seminary in Wilmore, Kentucky.
EndNotes
1 Fenella Cannell, editor, (2006) The Anthropology of Christianity. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press. Matthew Engelke and Matt Tomlinson, editors (2006)
The Limits of Meaning: Case Studies in the Anthropology of Christianity. Oxford:
Berghahn Books.

S. T. KimbroughJr. and Kenneth G. C. Newport, eds.
The Manuscript Journal of the Reverend Charles Wesley, M.A. Vols. 1,2
2008. Nashville: Kingswood Books
JohnR. Tyson
Assist Me to Proclaim: The Life and Hymns of Charles Wesley
2007 Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans
Reviewed by Kenneth J. Collins
Even though it is now more than two hundred years since the birth of
Charles Wesley, research into his life and thought yet remains at a rudimentary
stage. Two works that are addressing this issue, each in its own way, are The
Manuscript Journal of the Reverend Charles Weslry and a new biography, Assist
Me to Proclaim: The Lift and Hymns of Charles Weslry. Although the first work
is a fine addition to the primary sources, it is not actually an autobiography of
Charles since it does not include the entirety of his life but ends abrupdy in
1756. The material that makes up this manuscript was found, oddly enough,
"among some loose straw on the floor of a public warehouse in London."
The manuscript was later purchased, along with some other materials, by
Thomas Jackson in 1831. However, neither Jackson's edition of the Journal
nor the subsequent attempt by Telford was complete and accurate since neither
was able to handle properly the shorthand material that was a part of the
original composition. Beyond this, Jackson took greater editorial liberties
with the text than were warranted with the result that a complete and accurate
edition of Charles Wesley's journal would have to await this twenty-first
century effort.
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The second work,AssistiVle to Proclaim, is indeed a birth-to-death biography
and it is interlaced with an able discussion of Charles Wlesley's poetic genius as
expressed in his numerous hymns. For those readers who are unfamiliar
with "the younger brother of Methodism," the life and thought of Charles
offers a number of contrasts to his older brother, John. To illustrate, Charles,
as Tyson aptly points out, was a turbulent personality often moved by passions
that John hardly or rarely felt. With his head and heart often out of sync,
Charles at times burst onto the scene (the Grace Murray fiasco, for instance)
and took bold and irremediable action that his hesitating brother could only
regret. "'ioreover, these differing personalities clashed theologically in terms
of the doctrine of Christian perfection, especially as to the manner of its
actualization. And Charles, for his part, never shared John's antipathy for the
rich but was far more gregarious. Indeed, John Gambold described Charles
Wesley as a 'man made for friendship."
As important as these differences are, the reader of Tyson's narrative is
nevertheless struck with the numerous similarities between these brothers
who were two of the principal leaders of the eighteenth-century evangelical
revival. Both, for example, sought early on to be sanctified before they were
justified; that is, they hoped to be saved by "my best endeavours to serve
God." Both doubted at one point whether they had ever been a Christian
demonstrating how important the Pietist notion of "real Christianity" (as
opposed to nominal Christianity) was to them. Both viewed the willingness
to die as an key indicator of saving faith. Both had important and memorable
evangelical conversions to the proper Christian faith which issued in freedom
from the guilt and power of sin. Both engaged in field preaching and confronted
the mobs in gracious serenity. Both informed their wives that they would not
preach one sermon less or travel one mile less in a married state than in a
single one. And both insulted the venerable at Oxford in prophetic sermons
that made them the pariahs of the University. To be sure, these similarities are
not only numerous but they are also stunning. That is, Charles and John
Wesley were not only brothers by birth they were also, in a real sense, brothers
in the gospeL
After his marriage to Sarah Gwynne in 1749, Charles Wesley effectively
settled down and travelled much less. He was therefore, as Tyson puts it,
"less amenable to his older brother's requests and demands for evangelistic
assistance." But the key tension that emerged between the brothers as their
careers progressed had to do with the issue of ecclesiology in general (would
Methodism remain within the Church of England?) and with lay preachers
in particular (Charles would Hre the lay preachers almost as fast as John would
hire them). Tyson offers a helpful and extensive discussion of this issue and
thereby reveals the theological trajectory of Charles that was distinctively his
own. Overall, then, Tyson's work is a faithful guide to a complex and
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sophisticated figure, one who deserves significant treatment in his own right
out from under the shadow of his far more famous brother.

Kenneth}. Collins is professor of historical theology and Wesley studies at
Asbury Theological Seminary in Wilmore, Kentucky.

Brian Stanley
The World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910
Studies in the History of Christian Missions
2009. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans
Reviewed ry Marcella Hoesl
In anticipation of the 100 th anniversary of the World Missionary
Conference, Edinburgh 1910 this excellent book by the Director of the Center
for the Study of Christianity in the Non-Western World, University of
Edinburgh, is most welcome. Using mainly primary sources the author
presents a fine panorama of people and events of the lively processes that
took place in the eight commissions that made this Conference so important
in church history. The book notes that the modern ecumenical movement
began with Edinburgh 1910, even though the word "ecumenical" was
abandoned due to differences in how "ecumenical" was understood. In that
context, an enlightening detail is the mention of the Roman Catholic Bishop
Bonomelli of Cremona who sent a letter of greeting to the Conference (Roman
Catholics were not represented). The Bishop was ~ friend of Angelo Roncalli,
who was to become John XXIII, the architect of the Second Vatican Council.
Chapter V 'Give Us Friends!~ words taken from the address by V.S. Azariah
(1874-1945), an Anglican clergyman from southern India, gives much food
for thought of the major issues facing churches today, such as race, imperialism,
inculturation, dependence on foreign aid, spirituality. (Roland Allen's classic,
Missionary Methods, Ours or St. Paul's? (1912) readily comes to mind.)
Chapter 10, Missionary Co-operation, gives an excellent distillation of the
proceedings of Commission VIII, 'Co-operation and the Promotion of Unity, '
so vital as we await Edinburgh 2010. As the author notes: "The promotion
of unity between Christians was a means to the end of co-operation in
mission, rather than the other way around" (279). Briefly referred to (317 f)
the Department of Mission at Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, England
was a remarkable cooperative endeavor of the six major British Missionary
Societies in Britain for many decades, and also for a number of European
societies including several from the United States-an ecumenical story yet to
be written.
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Photos, footnotes at the bottom of each page, a full bibliography add to
the readability of this book. It will serve well as a learning and teaching tool
for church historians, missiologists, ecumenists, all persons who wish to
understand the movement of the churches to this day, what we can learn
from probing the past, and with hope for the future of the ecumenical
movement.
Marcella Hoesl is a Maryknoll Sister and the former academic dean and
professor of systematic theology at Oblate School of Theology in San
Antonio, Texas.

Geordan Hanunond and David Rainey, eds.
Wesley & Methodist Studies. Volume I
2009. Manchester, UK- Didsbury Press
Reviewed by HowardA. S /ryder
This atttactive peer-reviewed journal is the fruit of the new Manchester
Wesley Research Centte, created in 2003 at Nazarene Theological College,
Manchester, in collaboration with several other Wesleyan-oriented institutions.
Cliff College in England and Asbury Theological Seminary are among the
collaborating institutions. The journal is linked as well with The Oxford
Centre for Methodism and Church History, Oxford Brookes University. The
coeditors are both associated with Nazarene Theological College.
The Manchester Wesley Research Centre was created "to support research
in the life and work of John and Charles Wesley, their contemporaries in the
eighteenth-century Evangelical Revival, their historical and theological
antecedents, their successors in the Wesleyan tradition, and contemporary
scholarship in the Wesleyan and Evangelical tradition." The journal's press
release makes the point that examining Wesleys' contemporaries means
"proponents or opponents."
Four of the five essays in this first annual issue are by research students at
Nazarene Theological College or the University of Manchester. Their topics
hint at the range of current Wesley research. John Cunningham writes on
"PneumatologyThrough Correspondence: The Letters of John Wesley and
John Smith' (1745-1748)." J. Russell Frazier's essay considers 'John Wesley's
Covenantal and Dispensational View of Salvation History"--apparently part
of his larger research on John Fletcher's doctrine of dispensations. Randall
McElwain writes on "Biblical Language in the Hymns of Charles Wesley,"
and D. R. Wilson on "'Thou shal[t] walk with me in white': Afterlife and
Vocation in the .Ministry of Mary Bosanquet Fletcher."
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The lead article by Henry D. Rack, emeritus senior lecturer at Manchester
and author of ReaJunable EnthuJiast: John Wes/!'}' and the Rife of JV[ethodism) is
titled "1\ Man of Reason and Religion? John Wesley and the Enlightenment."
Rack notes recent reassessments of the Enlightenment, then revisits the
question of John Wesley's reasonableness or credulity. "Wesley was nearer
than has often been allowed to the centre of a spectrum stretching from
deists and sceptics at one end to claimants to divine inspiration at the other,"
Rack concludes, seconding David Hempton's assessment that \Vesley
embodied "creative tension between
enlightenment and enthusiasm."
However Rack notes Alexander Knox's caveat that Wesley "was prone to find
supernatural explanations where natural ones were more plausible."
Rack summarizes Wesley's views on toleration, education, politics, social
reform, and church order. Commenting on \Vesley's ecclesiology, Rack points
out the paradox that in forming a voluntary society (largely) within the Church
of England, Wesley "was unwitLingly organizing a religious body on
ecclesiastical principles quite different from those of most existing English
churches" and thme he himself formally espoused.
Cunningham's essay concludes that "perceptible inspiration was the essence
of John Wesley's economic pneumatology." For "since inspiration is
perceptible, the nature of the Holy Spirit is self-revelatory. God seeks selfdisclosure." Cunningham sees a practical implication: "In order to be faithful
to its namesake, Wesley studies (especially those in theology) must always be
framed by his commitment to tlle relational nature of God's Holy Spirit."
J. Russell Frazier examines John Wesley's understanding of history,
particularly his use of the themes of providence, covenant, and dispensation.
Wesley's emphasis on history was part of his case against predestination,
providing a "cogent view of his tory against the Calvinist doctrine of decrees."
Calvinism "seemed to bypass the significance of personal histories of
conversions due to its emphasis on divine tlat," whereas "Wesley's theology
authenticated salvation experiences" embedded in real history. "Wesley
developed a theology of history which gave meaning to personal histories as
well as the history of salvation within the world."
In his essay McElwain says the biblical language in Charles Wesley's hymns
was "both the natural outflow of a lifetime of biblical study and a deliberate
effort to 'preach'" through hymnody. The article is part of a larger project
examining Charles Wesley's biblical interpretation.
D. R. \Vilson explores Mary Bosanquet Fletcher's fifty-year ministry in
terms of both her spiritual journey-particularly her "belief in the afterlife
and concern for the unconverted"-and the complex of liberties and
restrictions facing Methodist women. Mary Pletcher's ministry included
"establishing a religions community of women" (on Pietist precedents),
"founding an orphanage, becoming one of the first female Methodist
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preachers, and playing a central role in the ministry of a local Anglican parish."
Wilson notes correctly that "N either the Established Church nor Methodism
as a movement with the Church, offered the opportunity for women to
[fully] pursue a call to either lay or ordained preaching." In ~lethodism,
restrictions actually increased over time (a familiar patrern in new movements).
The essay is adds to the growing body of research on Mary Bosanquet Fletcher
and other early Methodist women preachers.
The welcome appearance of Wesley & lviethodist Studies is another sign of
the international ±lowering of Wesley studies today. Where I teach in Toronto
half a dozen of competent younger Canadiall scholars are pursuing doctoral
work in \1Vesley studies, and similar things are happening elsewhere. Growing
international collaboration as represented by this journal speaks well for the
future of Wesley studies in the new century.
Wesley & iviethodist Studies is now accepting submissions for future
publication. Information is available at www.mwrc.ac.uk/wesley-andmethodist-studies /
Howard A. Snyder is professor of Wesley studies at Tyndale Seminary in
Toronto, Ontario.

Can you define
cosmoanthropecclesiology?
a. It's what happens when you sneeze.
b. It's the type of knot church members will use to hog-tie
you for using the word "science" in a sermon.
c. It's Christian confusion about how cosmology,
anthropology and ecclesiology intersect.
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IfyouYve ever wondered how to connect
fotth and sczence in your mtnlstryy Q3
is the conference for you.
You'll come away from Q3 with a renewed excitement about God's
Word and a fresh , informed perspective on the sciences. Join us as we
tackle three big questions at the intersection of faith and science.

Register at asburyseminary.edu
Early-bird: $49 per person

(through Feb. 15, 2010)

Individual: $99 per person

(after Feb. 15, 2010)

Group: $49 per person

(group of 5 or more)

Asbury Seminary students receive the early-bird rate. CEU credits are available.
Call Ginny Proctor at 859.858 .2301 with any questions.
Funded by a grant from the John Templeton foundation's Science for Ministry Initiative.
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